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Abstract
Research has demonstrated that social norms can impact behavior and consumption
in a meaningful way. A better understanding of social norms can result in a better
understanding of consumers and of market dynamics and indicate a way for firm to
improve their profitability.
In Essay 1: The Effect of Social Pressure on Corporate Social Responsibility, I in-
vestigate consumers’ reactions to products that include donations (a form of Corporate
Social Responsibility, CSR). I identify “warm glow” and “social pressure” as the two
principal drivers. On one hand, products offered by CSR-engaged firms are more ap-
pealing because of the warm glow consumers derive from choosing a product associated
with a donation to their favored causes; such products directly enhance customer util-
ity. On the other hand, once donations reach a threshold amount, consumers might
feel social pressure to reciprocate the firm’s donation. While such pressure can move
some consumers to buy the product, it reduces utility and can lead some consumers to
opt out of the market. Plainly, warm glow is favorable to selling CSR products, but
does social pressure aversion imply that rational firms will never employ such appeals?
Large numbers of firms do rely on social pressure based appeals (e.g., the Pink Ribbon
campaign for breast cancer). When and why is this a wise choice?
In two separate experiments, I find evidence for warm glow and social pressure
effects. I formalize and quantify these effects with a novel utility function that em-
bodies these opposing effects and find them to be of the same order of magnitude;
hence, both are managerially relevant. To develop this idea further, I build a model
of a profit-maximizing firm that recognizes these warm glow and social pressure aver-
sion preferences of its customers. Under a duopolistic market structures, I find that if
warm glow is large enough, a firm will also engage in social pressure appeals despite
its customers’ aversion to social pressure. Put differently, despite its negative effect on
consumers’ preferences, employing social pressure in a CSR context can be profitable.
Why? Intuitively, social pressure diminishes price sensitivity.
In Essay 2: Fairness Ideals in Distribution Channels, I examine the norm of fair-
ness. Existing research suggests that concerns for fairness may significantly affect the
iv
interactions between firms in a distribution channel. I analytically and experimentally
evaluate how firms make decisions in a two-stage dyadic channel, in which firms decide
on investments in the first stage and then on prices in the second stage. I find that firms’
behavior differs significantly from the predictions of the standard economic model and
is consistent with the existence of fairness concerns.
Using a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) model, in which both the manufac-
turer and retailer make noisy best responses, I show fairness significantly impacts chan-
nel pricing decisions. Additionally, I compare four principles of distributive fairness:
strict egalitarianism, liberal egalitarianism, and libertarianism, previously considered in
the fairness literature, and a new principle of distributive fairness the sequence-aligned
ideal that is studied first time in literature. Surprisingly, the new ideal, according to
which the sequence of moving determines the formation of equitable payoff for players,
significantly outperforms other fairness ideals.
v
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Chapter 1
Social Pressure and Warm Glow
Effects of Corporate Social
Responsibility
Companies today engage in a wide variety of initiatives aimed at improving the envi-
ronment, as well as the world at large. Such initiatives, which range from donating part
of a company’s profits to charities to allowing employees to devote part of their work-
ing time to volunteering, have been grouped under the umbrella term Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR). According to Luo and Bhattacharya (2006), as many as 90% of
Fortune 500 companies engage in CSR, and Brown (2007) claims companies’ donations
to charities, adjusted for inflation, rose by 166% between 1967-1971 and 2001-2006.
Even during the recent economic crisis, corporate donations rose by 21.6% in real terms
between 2008 and 2010 (Giving USA 2011).
Given the importance of CSR, it is not surprising that many researchers have studied
the causes and consequences of CSR. However, there is little consistency regarding the
basic effects of such corporate efforts. For instance, while it is intuitively plausible
that a company might engage in CSR to increase profitability (Aupperle, Carrol, and
Hatfield 1985; McGuire, Sundgren, and Schneeweis 1988) and market value (Arora and
Gangopdhyay 1995; Segerson and Miceli 1998), there is no consistent evidence linking
CSR to financial performance. A meta-analysis of 162 CSR studies by Margolis et al.
1
2(2007) found, for instance, that 58% of studies indicate no significant effect of CSR on
company performance, 27% find a positive effect, and 2% report a negative effect.1
Given the prevalence of CSR and the lack of research showing that it holds benefits for
companies, practitioners and researchers alike are curious to find definitive evidence.
To move toward an answer, I study one common form of CSR: products with “embed-
ded donations.” Each purchase of such a product commits the firm to giving a certain
amount of money to a cause or charity: “Buy this,” the companies say, “And we will
give $2 to support clean water efforts,” for instance. Several scholars suggest that these
CSR actions are a response to consumers’ desires and increase consumers’ preferences
for a product (e.g., Elfenbein, Fisman, and McManus 2010; Luo and Battacharya 2006;
Navarro 1988). However, the bundling of the donation and purchase creates an interest-
ing confluence of effects. While the donation itself may be desired by consumers, , Dell
Vigna et al. (2012) contend that consumers have an aversion to be pressured— “...dis-
like to be seen as not giving...” . They demonstrate that consumers exhibit this dislike
when asked to donate to charities directly by sorting themselves out of the interaction.
I extend this proposition to donation embedded products. Thus, shoppers might buy a
product with an embedded donation not just because CSR increased their preference,
but because they feel obligated to behave generously and reciprocate a conscientious
action by the firm. In this case, exploiting social pressure to change consumers’ choices
might come at the cost of reduced utility for consumers.
Indeed, in a series of experiments, I find here that targeting donations at a preferred
charity through embedded premiums has a positive effect on consumers’ utility through
“warm glow”, while increasing social pressure has a negative effect on consumers’ utility.
I formalize these insights with a novel utility function for products associated with
CSR. While the utility increasing aspect of CSR has been examined by using warm glow
preference representation (Baron 2007; Besley and Ghatak 2007; Graff-Zivin and Small
2005; and Krishna and Rajan 2009), to the best of my knowledge, aversion to social
pressure in the context of CSR and has never been formally represented. In my work, I
adapt the representation of aversion to social pressure used by Della Vigna et al. (2012)
in the public good context to the embedded donation context.
1 The remaining 13% percent of studies contained no information on sample size, so researchers
could not compute significance.
3As a second step, I use this utility function to quantify consumers’ sensitivity to
warm glow and aversion to social pressure. Using experimental (conjoint) data and a
maximum likelihood approach, I estimate the parameters for aversion to social pressure
and sensitivity to warm glow. When associated with a $0.89 Yoplait yogurt, a $1
donation to a charity chosen by the consumer yields a disutility from public social
pressure of up to a $0.70 increase in price and a utility from warm glow equivalent to
little less than a $0.90 discount.
Finally, I model rational firms that face consumers who display preferences of the
kind described above. These firms can choose a price and a level of donation. By
endogenizing the donation embedding decision, I can determine whether embedding
donations is simply a characteristic of certain “responsible” firms, or whether it is a
strategic response of profit-maximizing firms to consumers’ social preferences. The
richness of the consumers’ utility function permits the possibility to represent different
and conflicting donation embedded product appeals and their consequences for firms’
decisions. Reflecting my experimental data, warm glow has a positive effect, while social
pressure has a negative effect on consumers’ utility, so that the net effect of embedding
donations is ambiguous. Interestingly, I find that CSR can be profit enhancing for firms,
and that although social pressure has a negative effect on consumers’ utility, it can have
a positive effect of firms’ profits.
My research makes several contributions to the understanding of CSR. First, I show
that embedding donations is a profitable business practice that can help maximize prof-
its, but I do not assume that embedded donations always have a positive effect on
consumers’ preferences. In fact, I highlight the fact that embedded donations can have
both positive and negative effects and that firms should be careful in designing their
CSR actions. Second, I unpack the effect of social pressure and warm glow on con-
sumers’ preferences for donation embedded products. I show that donations impact
social pressure and warm glow in opposite ways. Social pressure negatively impacts
consumers’ utility, but it can still, under some conditions, increase firms’ profits. This
finding is of great practical relevance for managers who seek to design donation em-
bedded products and hope to effectively exploit aversion to social pressure. Third, I
quantify aversion to social pressure and sensitivity to warm glow in monetary terms.
This allows me to evaluate the relative importance and managerial relevance of warm
4glow and social pressure effects on consumers’ CSR choices. Finally, my model offers
a utility function that formalizes social pressure in the relationship between a firm and
its customers. Such a model can be adapted to study a wide array of transactions.
My study is organized as follows. First, I provide a background on donation em-
bedded products by reviewing the current literature on CSR and its appeals to con-
sumers. Then I present a series of experiments investigating consumers’ reactions to
CSR appeals. Based on the results, I formalize consumers’ preferences and quantify the
parameters of the utility function. Next, I analyze a model that describes how pro-social
consumer preferences affect firms’ decisions and profitability, as well as donation levels
and welfare. I conclude with proposed directions for future research.
1.1 Corporate Social Responsibility
CSR is believed to have a number of positive effects on consumers. Among them, CSR
increases consumers’ willingness to pay (Arora and Henderson 2007; Elfenbein and Mc
Manus 2010; and Henderson and Arora 2010) and increases satisfaction and trust (Du
et al. 2011; Luo and Bhattacharya 2006). It would be natural to think that such
positive effects would also translate into better performance for firms engaging in CSR.
However, several studies find that the effects of CSR on firm performance are not so
clear-cut (Margolis et al. 2007).
A number of reasons are believed to be at the root of these contrasting results. The
first is that different performance measures react differently to CSR initiatives. For
example, measures of a firm’s intangible value (e.g., Tobin’s q) may be better at picking
up the effect of CSR than accounting-based measures (e.g., return on investment; Luo
and Battacharya 2006). Another reason could be that the effects of CSR are tied to
a series of contingency conditions (Sen et al. 2006). For example, it is not enough
for a firm to engage in CSR to reap its benefits-consumers must also be aware of the
firm’s efforts (Sen et al. 2006). Finally, a number of moderating factors can influence
CSR’s effect on consumers. For example, Winterich and Barone (2011) find that CSR
increases consumers’ preferences for a product only if customers identify with the cause
supported by the firm. Luchs et al. (2010) find that the fit between CSR and product
characteristics can impact the effect of CSR.
5These multiple effects of CSR initiatives make it hard to track the effect of CSR on
firm performance. Hence, I focus my investigation on consumers’ reactions to CSR as
an antecedent of firm performance.
1.1.1 Warm Glow
CSR can impact consumers’ utility by changing the appeal-in fact, by heightening the
appeal-of the product. Several mechanisms by which CSR can have this impact have
been proposed.
First, CSR could simply be an “embedded premium” that works like a price pro-
motion (Arora and Henderson 2007; Henderson and Arora 2010). That is, the “social
good” is seen as a free add-on. Alternatively, CSR can be seen as a signal. Navarro
(1988) proposes that CSR, like advertising, can act as a costly signal of quality for a firm,
increasing consumers’ perception of a firm’s quality. This effect is found to be stronger
for firms that are new to the market and/or those with a low reputation (Elfenbein and
McManus 2010). CSR can also act as a signal to the consumer about relevant social
comparisons. For example, buying a CSR product can be used to signal the consumer’s
own status (Griskevicius et al. 2010).
Of course, the effect of CSR can be moderated, and in some extreme cases reversed,
by the fit between the CSR action and the firm’s products (Luchs et al. 2010) or
customers (Winterich and Barone 2011), as well as by the credibility of the CSR action
(Becker-Olsen et al. 2006).
No matter which of these mechanisms is at work, they all have the effect of modifying
consumers’ utility for the product. The change can be likened to the warm glow an agent
feels when she is contributing to a public good (Andreoni 1989; Baron 2007; Besley and
Ghatak 2007; Graff-Zivin and Small 2005; and Krishna and Rajan 2009). Hence, this
change in embedded donation product valuation can be compactly described by warm
glow-like preferences.
In general, if consumers experience a warm glow (i.e., consumers care about dona-
tions to a public good), it is rational for a profit-maximizing firm to engage in CSR.
For example, Besley and Ghatak (2007) and Krishna and Rajan (2009) show that in
markets where warm-glow consumers exist, it can be profitable to engage in CSR, while
Baron (2009) shows that in a market where a profit-maximizing firm and a competing
6social firm face warm-glow consumers, the former firm can be forced to engage in CSR
by consumers’ activism.
CSR can change (and often improve) consumers’ perceptions about products and
the companies that sell them.
1.1.2 Social Pressure
A number of firms’ CSR actions seem to be aimed at making their pro-social behavior
as public as possible. Consider the Susan B. Komen Society’s breast cancer awareness
“Pink Ribbon” campaign. During the month of October, now designated as a month
of awareness, a number of firms sell products ranging from chocolate to bags, from
Post-It notes to kitchen appliances, all to raise funds for research on breast cancer. The
products associated with the campaign are very clearly identified by the color pink (see
Figure 1.1), immediately recognizable by shoppers as associated with raising money for
cancer research and treatment. At the same time that this type of initiative brings
attention to the CSR initiative, it also creates social pressure for consumers to buying
the donation embedded product. This social pressure is distinct from warm glow and
is not necessarily utility enhancing for consumers. In fact, social pressure might lead
people to choose a less preferred action to avoid being “seen as not giving...” (Della
Vigna et al. 2012). That is, they may still buy the product, but out of guilt, not because
it’s the best choice for their needs.
This is similar to the context of public goods. When a solicitor explicitly asks for
a donation, an individual might choose to donate just to avoid the guilt associated
with saying “no” (e.g., Andreoni et al. 2012; Della Vigna et al. 2012). In this case,
the behavior does not reflect an unconstrained preference, but only a context-specific
decision to donate. Without an in-person ask, the same individual might have well
declined to contribute. In fact, Andreoni et al. (2012) and Della Vigna et al. (2012)
find that when subjects are given a chance to avoid direct solicitation, some do so. They
suggest this finding is evidence that social pressure has a negative effect on consumers’
utility, and it can only be avoided by sorting out of the market or by complying with
the solicitor’s request.
While a number of studies have modeled the impact of warm glow on consumers’
and firms’ CSR choices (Bagnoli and Watts 2003; Baron 2009; Besley and Ghatak
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Figure 1.1: A sample of products from the “pink ribbon campaign”
2007; and Krishna and Rajan 2009), to the best of my knowledge, not much attention
has been dedicated to the effect of social pressure on consumers’ utility and firm CSR
choices. Even in the more general context of public goods, with the exception of Della
Vigna et al. (2012), scholars tend to focus on only one of the two drivers of consumers’
contributions to public goods while ignoring the other. Therefore, I study the effect of
social pressure on consumers’ attitudes toward products associated with CSR, including
both the warm glow effect and negative social pressure.
My objective is to highlight the importance of separating warm glow and social
pressure arising from firms’ CSR actions. Moreover, I seek to investigate the impact
of social pressure on firm profits to understand why firms engage in initiatives such
as the Pink Ribbon campaign, even though the campaigns exacerbate social pressure.
Finally, I seek to quantify the effect of social pressure and warm glow to understand
their empirical relevance.
81.2 Donation Embedded Products
In this section, I show evidence that CSR can activate both warm glow and social
pressure. As mentioned above, I focus on a specific class of CSR actions: donation em-
bedded products. When a donation embedded product is purchased, the firm commits
to donate a sum of money to a charity or cause. Such products are a common form of
CSR in the marketplace, embracing efforts such as research on breast cancer (e.g., the
aforementioned “Pink Ribbon” campaign) to fighting AIDS (e.g., Gap’s (RED) cam-
paign) and including products from fast-moving consumer goods like candies to durable
products like electronic and sport equipment to services like credit cards (f see 1.2).
There is a methodological advantage to focusing on embedded donations. Here, it is
clear that the action unambiguously raises costs for the firm. This rules out a number
of alternative explanations wherein the CSR action is undertaken because it actually
reduces the firm’s costs. For instance, appeals to consumers to switch to e-mail bills over
paper (with a commitment to send donations to charities) are often viewed skeptically
since the switch also reduces the firm’s mailing costs.
 
Pink Ribbon for Breast Cancer 
(RED) for HIV 
LIVESTRONG for Cancer 
Figure 1.2: A sample of donation embedded products
91.2.1 Social Pressure and Sorting Out
If embedding donations into products has a positive effect on consumers’ preferences
through warm glow, then raising the amount of donation (and holding everything else
constant constant) should cause consumers to keep or increase their preferences for
the donation embedded product. Warm glow can have decreasing marginal returns to
donation amounts (e.g. Arora and Henderson 2007; and Henderson and Arora 2010),
but nothing in the warm glow literature would explain a decrease in product preferences
when donated amount increases.
Data showing a decrease in preferences would suggest that warm glow cannot entirely
explain reactions to donation embedded products.How do we demonstrate a lowered
preference? One approach is to estimate a utility function that embeds such effects.
However, I begin with offering direct behavioral evidence. Following Della Vigna et
al. 2012, who demonstrate that consumers exit or “sort out” when asked to donate to
a charity because of their aversion to social pressure, I develop an experiment with a
donation embedded product where subjects have an opportunity to exit.
Restaurant Study Subjects in a 2 X 3 (Matching X Setting) between subjects design
were asked to imagine a situation in which they were meeting a friend for dinner at a
restaurant. The first factor, (matching), varied three levels of donation to a charity.
Subjects were informed the restaurant was participating in a campaign to raise funds to
fight HIV/AIDS. This scenario resembles the popular “Dining Out for Life” campaign,
a real annual event.2
Subjects were told that their bill would be increased by 10% and this money would
be donated to the charity. Additionally, the restaurant would add matching donations.
The restaurant’s matching amounts were varied, so that the restaurant contributed 5%,
10%, or 20% of the bill to the cause. In the first case, with the restaurant giving 5%
matching, the subject would be more generous than the restaurant; in the second case,
10%, subject and restaurant would be equally generous; and in the last case, 20%, the
subject would be less generous than the restaurant.
Notice that as the restaurant’s donation increased, the total donation always in-
creased, but the subject’s relative generosity (compared to the restaurant) decreased. If
2 For more information on the campaign, visit diningoutforlife.com.
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warm glow alone mattered, the increased total donation should lead more consumers to
choose to stay the higher the restaurant’s donation rose. If subjects instead dislike being
seen as “not generous,” the restaurant’s increased donation should lead fewer subjects
to stay.
The second factor, (setting), varied the degree to which the interaction was public.
I supposed that social pressure would be magnified in a situation where someone could
judge subjects’ generosity. In the less public (door) condition, subjects learned about
the campaign from a flier posted at the restaurant door. In the more public (table)
condition, they were informed about it by the waitperson after being seated at their
table. In the latter case, the increased public aspect-the pressure exerted by a direct
interaction with a person and by having already taken a table in the restaurant, where
other diners can see the subjects-should increase the negative effect of appearing less
generous as the restaurant’s donations increase.
The dependent variable measures subjects’ response to being asked whether they
would stay at the participating restaurant or leave and walk to a comparable, non-
participating restaurant in the neighborhood. To control for heterogeneous price expec-
tations, subjects were told the target restaurant offered a prix fixe meal for $19.99.
Stimuli were presented on-line to subjects recruited via mTurk, and 705 subjects
completed the study.
Results. Table 1.1 reports the result of the experiment. Across conditions, the large
majority of subjects chose to stay at the restaurant (81.99%), indicating that the pro-
motion was largely appreciated. Moreover and perhaps unsurprisingly, when I disregard
the matching level, a larger number of subjects decided to stay at the restaurant when
they learned about the promotion at the table rather than at the door. It seems it is
harder to leave the restaurant when you are already at the table than when you are still
outside.
Comparing matching conditions, we find that the condition in which the restaurant
matches the 10% donation from the customer with an equal 10% garners the highest
number of “stayers”. This contradicts warm glow. In fact, given that I have kept cost to
subjects constant across matching condition, higher total donations (the highest restau-
rant contribution level) should be at least weakly preferred by subjects and translate
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into at least the same share of stayers as the 10% matching condition. So why do the
subjects prefer the evenly matched donation?
Table 1.1: Restaurant Study—Descriptives
Matching
Setting
Table Door Total
5%
N 129 116 245
Stay 84.50% 75.00% 80.00%
10%
N 110 103 213
Stay 91.82% 75.73% 84.04%
20%
N 128 87 247
Stay 82.81% 81.51% 82.19%
Total
N 367 338 705
Stay 86.10% 77.51% 81.99%
To answer this question, I ran two logit regression models to predict the likelihood
of staying at the restaurant. In the first model, I included only the effect of matching
and location (Column 1 Table 1.2). Being at the door (versus sitting at the table) made
a subject less likely to stay, and I found directional evidence that, compared to subjects
in the 10% matching condition, subjects in the 20% matching condition were less likely
to stay. This was true also of the subjects in the 5% matching condition. Whether at
the door or the table, subjects may think the 20% matching is unbelievable and decide
to leave the restaurant because they think the donation is a scam (there should be no
interaction between matching and location). In contrast, if the drop in likelihood of
staying between the 20% and the 10% matching condition was due to social pressure,
we would expect to observe a higher drop in the table than in the door condition.
To determine which explanation better explains the data, I ran a second model in
which I added the interaction of matching and location (Column 2 Table 1.2). The
results of this second model indicate that social pressure is the preferred explanation.
First, when controlling for the interaction, the difference between the 10% matching
condition and the other two conditions is significant, suggesting that raising the match
from 10% to 20% significantly decreases the likelihood of staying at the focal restaurant.
Additionally, the interaction of match 20% and location at the door has a significant
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Table 1.2: Restaurant Study—Logit Models
Model (1) Model (2)
Dep. Var. Coeff. Coeff.
Stay=1 (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Ind. Var.
Door -0.589 -1.280
(.200)*** (.417)***
Match20 -0.135 -0.845
(.252) (.419)**
Match5 -0.284 -0.722
(.248) (.424)*
Door*Match20 1.191
(.533)**
Door*Match5 0.683
(.528)
Constant 1.976 2.418
(.221)*** (.348)***
Observations 705 705
Log Likelihood -327.4 -324.8
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
and positive effect on the likelihood of staying. In this condition, people at the door are
more likely to stay at the restaurant than people at the table. This contrasts with the
10% condition, in which people at the door were more likely to leave than people at the
table, and in the 5% condition, where there was no significant difference in likelihood
of leaving between the two conditions. Finally, by contrasting the marginal effects we
can see that subjects in the table condition were less likely to stay when there was a
20% matching than when there was 10% (p < .05), while in the door condition, such
contrast is not significant (p = .30).
We can speculate that this pattern of results is due to the interaction of warm glow
and social pressure. First note that warm glow and social pressure have two opposing
effects: warm glow will lead subjects to sort into the market, while social pressure will
lead subjects to sort out of the market. As the restaurant match increases, warm glow
will increase because total donations are increasing. At the same time, social pressure
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will increase as the subject’s generosity (relative to the restaurant) decreases. The
aversion is magnified when the waitress witnesses the lack of generosity of a patron.
According to my theory, I expect warm glow to increase at the same rate between the
table and the door condition, while I expect social pressure to grow at a higher rate
between the door and the table condition.
In fact, at the door, when there is no wait staff present, the net effect of warm glow
and social pressure is such that there is no significant difference between the 10% and
the 20% matching condition. However, in the table condition, where a restaurant staffer
is present, in the 20% (vs. 10%) matching condition, social pressure is heightened to a
level where it outweighs warm glow and causes consumers’ to sort out of the market.
These results provide a strong first indication that both social pressure and warm
glow apply to the context of product embedded donations, but that they have opposing
and significant effects on consumers’ behavior. One caution: social pressure and warm
glow rise simultaneously with donations, and are thus not manipulated independently.
I cannot separately identify and quantify the effect of warm glow and social pressure.
Using additional experiments, I manipulate each effect separately, allowing for better
characterization of their impacts on consumer behavior.
1.2.2 Separating Warm Glow and Social Pressure
I undertook three experiments intended to use subjects’ product choices to isolate the
effect of social pressure on consumers’ utility from the effect of warm glow. I also aimed
to characterize consumers’ reactions to warm glow.
In the three experiments, I found that: 1) consumers’ utility decreases when social
pressure increases; 2) consumers’ utility increases (less than proportionally) with the
donation amount; and 3) consumers’ utility increases if consumers like the beneficiary
more.
Kindle Experiment
Experimental Design In this study, I asked subjects to choose between products
associated with the well-known “Pink Ribbon” campaign. I ran my study in October
2011 (National Breast Cancer Awareness month), when this campaign is highly salient
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and social pressure to contribute to breast cancer research is particularly high. Even
NFL players participate in the annual awareness campaign by wearing pink shoes and
other gear during football games and media appearances.
In my experiment, 47 subjects recruited on mTurk were shown Kindle triplets (two
associated with a donation, one not associated with a donation) and a no-buy option.
They repeated this choice task 8 times with different Kindle triplets (for an example of
a choice set, see Figure 1.3). The Kindle e-readers varied on 3 factors: 1) price: $79 or
$89; 2) donation: $0, $5, or $10 donated to the Susan G. Komen Foundation; and 3)
visibility: a special (pink) vs. a classic (grey) edition Kindle.
 
Figure 1.3: Sample choice set
To capture the effect of warm glow, I manipulated the level of donation. Since warm
glow is meant to capture the effect of donations on utility, by varying donation levels
I could capture whether embedding donations elicited positive feelings, and, if so, how
such warm glow varies with different levels of donations.
I manipulate social pressure, by the visibility of consumers’ choice to other people.
Recall that I define social pressure as the “ dislike to be seen as not giving” (Della Vigna
et al. 2012), increasing visibility of consumers’ choices of donation embedded product
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increases social pressure. In this experiment, I changed the visibility of consumers’
choices of donation embedded product independent of donation by varying the style
of the product. The special edition Kindle was identified by its pink color. Subjects
were told that choosing the pink product would tell everyone they supported breast
cancer research. The classic edition (grey) Kindle was indistinguishable from the regular
Kindle, so subjects’ support for the cause would remain anonymous. Hence, the special
edition Kindle (high visibility) corresponded to the condition of high social pressure,
while the classic edition Kindle (low visibility) corresponded to low social pressure.3
Finally, I manipulate price at two levels to capture the net utility for the product
itself compared to the no-buy option which is normalized to zero utility.
Results. I analyzed the data with a conditional logit discrete choice model. The
results are reported in Table 1.3. As evidenced by AIC and BIC, the random coefficient
models do a better job of describing consumers’ choices than the regular models. In the
interest of space, I concentrate the discussion on these results. 4
Social pressure decreases consumers’ utility. Model 3 in Table 1.3 indicates that an
increase in social pressure decreases subjects’ utility (Special Edition: -1.11, p < 0.05).
I find that warm glow increases consumers’ utility. All of the coefficients associated
with positive donations in Table 1.3 are positive and significant. In addition, while the
$15 donation is three times larger than the $5 donation, the coefficient associated with
the $15 donation ($15 Donation: 3.92, p < 0.01) is less than twice than the coefficient
for $5 ($5 Donation: 7.05, p < 0.01). This finding shows a decreasing effect of donation
on willingness to pay and confirms results from previous studies (Arora and Henderson
2007; Henderson and Arora 2010).
I examined the possibility that women are more sensitive to breast cancer research
by interacting gender with donation. I find that both interaction coefficients between
gender and donations are positive; however, only one coefficient is significant (Table 1.3
Model (4) - $15 Donation X Female: 2.63, p < 0.01).
3 Note: Not all regular edition Kindles were embedded with donations, however, all special edition
Kindles profiles included a donation.
4 Appendix A describes the research sample in greater detail.
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Table 1.3: Logit Model Estimates – Kindle
Fixed Coefficients Random Coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. Coeff. Coeff. Mean of SD of Mean of SD of
Choice=1 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Ind. Var.
Kindle 12.449 12.814 37.359 5.933 41.276 0.602
(1.441)*** (2.170)*** (3.914)*** (1.234)*** (6.289)*** (.683)
Price -0.159 -0.166 -0.360 0.075 -0.492 0.116
(.018)*** (.027)*** (.047)*** (.018)*** (.075)*** (.031)***
$5 Donation 1.673 1.541 3.922 1.249 4.329 0.574
(.245)*** (.341)*** (.679)*** (.600)** (.824)*** (.635)
$15 Donation 2.933 2.450 7.049 3.165 6.053 3.674
(.235)*** (.315)*** (1.164)*** (.737)*** (1.206)*** (.731)***
Special Edition -0.400 -1.057 -1.107 6.254 -4.809 6.662
(.173)** (.285)*** (.505)** (1.212)*** (1.872)** (1.130)***
Kindle female 1.125 1.265 3.009
(3.047) (6.875) (1.024)***
Price female -0.004 0.133 0.070
(.038) (.077) (.026)***
$5 Donation female 0.529 -0.112 0.411
(.525) (.954) (.618)
$15 Donation female 1.254 2.633 1.696
(.505)** (1.194)** (.848)**
Special Edition female 1.102 4.733 0.121
(.366)*** (2.059)** (.467)
N 1,504 1,504 1,504 1,504
LL -362.19 -333.23 -223.43 -209.36
AIC 734.39 686.47 466.86 458.71
BIC 760.97 739.63 520.01 565.03
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Discussion. In this experiment, I find that subjects display an increase in utility
for a higher level of donations to breast cancer, but at a diminishing rate. Notice,
however, since I focused on a single cause, the sensitivity of donations to that cause is
indistinguishable from the overall warm glow itself.
I find that social pressure decreased preference for the donation embedded product.
However, since social pressure is manipulated as the pink special edition product, I am
concerned with threats to validity. Consider the effect of gender (Model 4 in Table 1.3).
Pink is a color associated with femininity, so males might be averse to the special edition
Kindle. The interaction coefficient of gender X social pressure is significant; the special
edition Kindle has significantly lower utility than the regular edition for males (Special
Edition: -4.81, p < 0.01), but not for females (Special Edition: -4.81+4.73=0.08, n.s.).
Pink, then, could have a negative effect on males, exacerbating the effect of social
pressure. Meanwhile, it could have a positive effect on women, reducing the negative
effect of social pressure. I deal with this confound in the experiment below.
Yoplait Experiments
Experimental Design. The next two experiments were designed to close the gaps
in the discussion of the first study. Specifically, I sought to separate styling/color from
social pressure. I also sought to separate sensitivity to warm glow from the donation
amount. I used a different product (consumable, not durable) to extend the validity of
the results.
Yoplait Experiment 1. In this experiment, 51 subjects recruited from mTurk were
asked to choose from Yoplait yogurt triplets (two different yogurts and a no-buy option).
They repeated this task for ten triplets. For an example of one choice set, see Figure
1.4). The yogurts differed on four factors: 1) price: $0.89 or $1.29; 2) donation level:
$0.10 or $0.30; 3) social pressure: public or private redemption; and 4) sensitivity to
warm glow: pick your charity or Project HOPE as the beneficiary of the donation.
As before, the price and donation amount manipulations are straightforward. Social
pressure was varied using the donation redemption process. Subjects were told that the
firm would make the promised donation when they entered a code printed under the
lid of the yogurt on a website. In the “public/visible” (high social pressure) condition,
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buyers had to go to a social media enabled site for the product, then enter their name
and product code. Subjects were told that other purchasers could go to the site and
see/search/compare donations. In the “private/anonymous” (low social pressure) con-
dition, they had to go to a company website for the product and enter the product code
anonymously. No search or comparison tools were provided on the site.
To study warm glow sensitivity, I also manipulated the beneficiary of the donation.
In the high sensitivity condition I allowed subjects to choose the charity they preferred
from a list of 200 popular charities5 , while in the low sensitivity condition, the ben-
eficiary of the donation was picked a priori by the researcher6 . Since preferences for
charities are distributed across the subject population, I reasoned that picking a charity
allowed subjects to align the donation beneficiary better with their own preferences.
This higher sensitivity should lead subjects to experience greater warm glow for any
given level of donation.
I analyzed the choice data with a conditional logit discrete choice model. The results
are reported in Table 1.4. As evidenced by AIC and BIC, the random coefficient model
does a better job of describing consumers’ choices than the regular models. As before,
I concentrate the discussion on the random coefficient model that help us characterize
warm glow and social pressure. For a description of the sample, see Appendix A.
Yoplait Experiment 1 confirms and extends the results of the Kindle Experiment.
Consumers experience positive utility from a firm’s donation (Table 1.4 Model (2) $0.30
Donation: 1.51, p < 0.01). Moreover, their utility increases less than proportionally to
increases in donations7 . This finding confirms results from the previous experiment
and suggests that people experience decreasing marginal returns from donations.
I find consumers are averse to social pressure (Table 1.4 Model (2) Public: -1.10,
p < 0.05). I also find that consumers exhibit higher sensitivity to warm glow when they
like the beneficiary of the donation more (Table 1.4 Model (2) Pick Your Own: 0.90,
p < 0.05) as distinct from the donation amount.
Despite the corroborative evidence from the Kindle and Yoplait experiments, there
5 The list was taken from the2010 Forbes list of the 200 largest U.S. charities.
6 The beneficiary of the donation in the low warm glow condition was Project HOPE, a charity that
delivers health education, medicines, supplies and volunteers where needed.
7 By scaling the donation coefficient by the price coefficient, I find that a $ 0.20 additional donation
is only worth about $ 0.13 to subjects
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Table 1.4: Logit Model Estimates–Yoplait Experiment 1
Fixed Coefficients Random Coefficients
(1) (2)
Dep. Var. Coeff. Mean of SD of
Choice=1 Coeff. Coeff.
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Ind. Var.
Yoplait 5.336 17.638 6.462
(.483)*** (2.040)*** (1.204)***
Price -4.605 -11.463 6.064
(.423)*** (1.295)*** (1.059)***
$0.30 Donation 0.539 1.513 0.521
(.163)*** (.292)*** (.475)
Public -0.672 -1.094 2.766
(.153)*** (.430)** (.440)***
Pick Your Own 0.447 0.898 2.331
(.149)*** (.394)** (.474)***
N 1,530 1,530
LL -455.18 -304.98
AIC 920.36 629.96
BIC 926.29 641.81
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
20
 
Figure 1.4: Screen shot of Yoplait choice set
are some unaddressed issues. Both studies employed the mTurk online setup. Subjects
recruited from this pool are paid a relatively small sum ($0.50 for the studies above)
to complete tasks online. The low stakes raise some question about the selection of the
sample as well as about the attention subjects dedicate to the study. The online setting
also limits control over subjects while completing the study. To overcome these issues,
I repeated the Yoplait study in a controlled laboratory setting using students recruited
at a large public university, making some additional design changes.
Yoplait Experiment 2. In this study, 61 students chose from a triplet of yogurt
products and a no-buy option. They were paid $9.00 for their participation. They
recorded their choices for 16 choice sets. For an example of a product choice set, see
Figure 1.5. In each choice set, two of the three yogurts included a donation. The no-
donation instance is different from that in the previous study. I manipulated 4 factors:
1) price: $0.89 or $1.29; 2) donation level: $0.00, $0.10 or $0.30; 3) sensitivity to warm
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glow: pick your charity or Project HOPE as the beneficiary of the donation; and 4)
social pressure: public vs. private redemption.
 
Figure 1.5: Screen shot of Yoplait choice set
As in the previous experiment, I analyzed the choice data using a conditional logit
discrete choice model. The results are reported in Table 1.5. As evidenced by AIC and
BIC, the random coefficient model does a better job of describing consumers’ choices
than the regular models. 8
This experiment further confirms and extends my results. First, the in-lab, univer-
sity setting and sample are very different from an online context. Second, the inclusion
of the yogurt option with no donation allows me to estimate the coefficient for Pick Your
Own (vs. Project Hope) as in the previous Yoplait experiment, but also the coefficient
for donation to Project Hope (vs. no donation), thereby shedding more light on the role
of charity choice in warm glow.
As for the previous experiments, I find that consumers experience positive utility
8 For a description of the sample, see Appendix A.
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Table 1.5: Logit Model Estimates–Yoplait 2
Fixed Coefficients Random Coefficients
(1) (2)
Dep. Var. Coeff. Mean of SD of
Choice=1 Coeff. Coeff.
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Ind. Var.
Yoplait 6.592 17.48 6.564
(.335)*** (1.122)*** (.578)***
Price -7.204 -12.58 4.165
(.352)*** (.794)*** (.486)***
Donation 3.409 5.272 4.502
(.606)*** (.986)*** (.749)***
Social Media -0.479 -0.506 2.436
(.108)*** (.224)** (.311)***
Fixed Charity 1.446 2.293 1.815
(.171)*** (.261)*** (.329)***
Pick Your Own 1.549 2.602 0.915
(.167)*** (.314)*** (.265)***
N 3,904 3,904
LL -923.3 -570.6
AIC 1,858.6 1,165.2
BIC 1,896.2 1,171.0
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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from the firm’s donation (Table 1.5 Model (2) Donation: 5.272, p < 0.01). I also find
that consumers exhibit greater warm glow sensitivity when they like the beneficiary of
the donation more; picking the beneficiary of the donation increased their utility (Table
1.5 Model (2) Pick Your Own: 2.602, p < 0.01 vs. Project Hope: 2.293, p < 0.01).
Finally, aversion to social pressure decreases utility in the high social pressure condition
(Table 1.5 Model (2) Social Media: -0.506, p < 0.05).
Discussion. These experiments show that social pressure has a negative effect on
consumers’ utility, after controlling for warm glow. Regarding warm glow, I am able to
separate buyers’ increase in utility from a higher level of donations from their greater
sensitivity to donations going to a cause that is more aligned with their preferences.
These results suggest that there are two contrasting effects on consumers’ utility
when donations embedded into a product are increased. In the next section, I propose
a consumer utility function embodying these effects so that I might quantify warm glow
sensitivity and social pressure aversion from these data.
1.2.3 Quantifying Warm Glow and Social Pressure
Utility function. Based on the experiments outlined above, a reasonable utility for a
donation embedded product should include: 1) the consumption utility for the product;
2) warm glow utility; and 3) social pressure disutility. I propose the following:
Ui =
{
v − p+ β√d if 0 ≤ d ≤ κp
v − p+ β√d− α(d− κp) if d > κp
(1.1)
where
v is the consumer’s gross valuation for the product;
p is the price of the product;
d is the firms’ donation to the charity;
β > 0 is the consumer’s sensitivity to warm glow;
0 < α < 1 is the consumer’s aversion to social pressure;
and 0 < κ < 1 scales the donation made by the firm.
Consumption utility, v, is the same for a given product with or without a donation.
The total warm glow, β
√
d, from buying a product that includes a donation is the
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product of consumer sensitivity to warm glow, β, attached to the target of the donation
and the amount of the donation, d. The square root term captures marginal decreasing
utility from donations as witnessed in my experiments.
Similar to Della Vigna et al. (2012), I find that social pressure arises as disutility for
deviating from the firm’s donation, d, the reference point against which agents compare
their response. As d increases and surpasses a threshold, κp, the consumers’ aversion
to social pressure multiplies this deviation level to create social pressure, α(d − κp).
Although consumers pay p, only part of p goes to offset the firm’s donation, so I use
κ to scale the price. Crucially, κ is not always such that d = κp. This allows some
flexibility in capturing what the consumer feels is the “right” amount to give.
The social pressure term matters only when the consumer contribution, κp, is smaller
than the firm’s, d, capturing the notion that agents feel social pressure only when they
perceive that they are not reciprocating sufficiently. Conversely, when the consumer
perceives that he or she has reciprocated sufficiently (d ≤ κp), that consumer does not
experience any social pressure. Note that this also means that consumers do not face
any social pressure when the firm does not embed a donation (d = 0).
Estimation procedure. Using the data from my experiments and the utility function
in Equation (1.1), I can estimate α, β and κ, as well as the coefficients for the price
and valuation of the product once I re-express utility of each alternative j observed by
subject i in each experiment with a linear function.
Valuation of the product v can be expressed as θvVij , where Vij is a dummy equal
to 1 when the alternative j for subject i is a Kindle (Yoplait yogurt) and 0 otherwise
(i.e., the no-buy alternative) and θv is the coefficient that captures the valuation of the
product. Similarly, price sensitivity can be expressed as θpPriceij , where Priceij is the
price for alternative j for subject i, and θp captures price sensitivity.
With regard to warm glow, recall that sensitivity is manipulated by letting subjects
pick their own charity versus assigning the charity. As such, βPY O captures sensitivity
to warm glow when the charity is picked by the subject, while βA captures sensitivity
to warm glow when the charity is assigned by the experimenter. The square root of
donation
√
dij is multiplied by an indicator dummy, IPY Oij , equal to 1 if the charity for
alternative j was chosen by subject i and 0 otherwise. Similarly, the square root of the
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donation
√
dij is multiplied by an indicator dummy, IAij , equal to 1 if the charity for
alternative j, subject i, was assigned by the researcher and 0 otherwise. In the no-buy
option, all of the dummies are switched off, so that IAij 6= (1 − IPY Oij). I expect that
βPY O > βA > 0.
Turning to social pressure, recall that aversion to social pressure, α, is manipulated
by the public versus private setting. αpub captures aversion to social pressure in the
public setting, while αpriv captures aversion to social pressure in the private setting.
The quantity αpub, (dij − κPriceij)+ is multiplied by an indicator dummy, Ipubij , equal
to 1 when the subject i’s response is public for alternative j and 0 otherwise. Similarly,
αpriv, (dij − κPriceij)+ is multiplied by an indicator dummy, Iprivij , equal to 1 when
the subject i’s response is private for alternative j and 0 otherwise. As above, for the
no buy option, all the dummies are switched off, so that Ipubij 6= (1− Iprivij). I expect
that that αpub < αpriv < 0.
Collecting terms, the estimation equation for alternative j for subject i can be
written as:
uij = θvVij + θpPriceij + βPY OIPY Oij
√
dij + βAIAij
√
dij (1.2)
+αpubIpubij(dij − κPriceij)+ + αprivIprivij(dij − κPriceij)+ + ij
Let κ be such that (dij − κPriceij)+ is always positive. Under the assumption that
κ < κ, equation (1.2) can be rearranged as:
uij = θvVij + θpPriceij − αpubκIpubijPriceij − αprivκIprivijPriceij (1.3)
+βPY OIPY Oij
√
dj + βAIAij
√
dij + αpubIpubijdij + αprivIprivjdij + ij
The re-expressed function, Equation (1.3), is linear in its parameters, which allows
me to write down the log-likelihood in a straightforward way. Assuming that error
follows a type-1 extreme value, the log-likelihood can be written as:
LL =
∑
i
∑
j e
uij∑N
κ e
uij
(1.4)
where N is the number of product alternatives seen by each subject in each trial. Below,
I turn to this estimation for each of the experiments.
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Kindle Experiment. I manipulated public versus private setting across subjects, but
I did not manipulate the beneficiary in the Kindle experiment. This eliminates βPY O,
and equation 3 for alternative j observed by subject i simplifies to:
uij = θvVij + θpPriceij − αpubκIpubijPriceij + βAIAij
√
d (1.5)
+αpubIpubijdij + αprivIprivijdij + ij
with 0 < κ < 0.06 = κ9
Table 1.6: Parameter Estimates - Kindle Experiment
Fixed Coefficients Random Coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. Coeff. Coeff. Mean of SD of Mean of SD of
Choice=1 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Ind. Var.
θV 4.514 12.458 4.648 2.575 12.559 2.470
(1.065)*** (1.457)*** (1.074)*** (.909)*** (1.464)*** (.922)***
θp -0.042 -0.159 -0.041 0.033 -0.158 0.031
(.013)*** (.018)*** (.013)*** (.013)** (.018)*** (.013)**
βA 0.628 0.645 0.486
(.176)*** (.162)*** (.241)**
κ 0.035 0.031 -
(.612) (.896)
αpriv 0.046 0.050 0.068
(.036) (.038) (.105)
αpub 0.008 0.005 0.120
(.047) (.043) (.092)
N 1,504 1,504 1,504 1,504
LL -489.0 -362.7 -483.6 -353.7
AIC 982.0 737.4 975.2 729.4
BIC 992.6 769.3 996.5 787.9
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
I find that the random coefficients specifications (Models 3 and 4, Table 1.6) explain
9 The highest value κ can take such that d− κp > 0 for all the data in the sample is κ = 5
89
= 0.06
27
the data better. The baseline Model 3 incorporates neither social pressure nor warm
glow from donations. Here, I find that the average subject has a positive utility for
Kindle (θv = 4.648, p < 0.01) and that the mean price coefficient is negative (θp =
−0.041, p < 0.01), indicating that subjects’ utility is decreasing in price. The model
with the behavioral parameters (Model 4 in Table 1.6) performs better than the model
without (Model 3 in Table 1.6). Sensitivity to warm glow is positive and significant
(β = 0.645, p < 0.01). Aversion to social pressure is insignificant in both the private
(αpriv = 0.050, p > 0.1) and the public condition (αpub = 0.005, p > 0.01).
The relevance of these results can be seen more clearly by using the price coefficient
from Equation 1.5, (θp) to rescale sensitivity to warm glow and aversion to social pres-
sure. I can compute that a $5 donation to the Susan G. Komen Foundation generates
warm glow of $9.13; donating an additional dollar generates about $0.87 additional will-
ingness to pay. For this sample, the cost of social pressure is insignificant, suggesting
that subjects are not willing to pay more or less due to social pressure. These conclu-
sions should be viewed with caution since we know that the social pressure manipulation
used in this experiment (the pink color) was viewed differently by men and women, in
effect confounding social pressure and liking.
Yoplait Experiment 1. I manipulated public versus private setting, as well as
“choose your charity” versus an assigned charity across subjects in the Yoplait exper-
iments. In the first study, in each choice triplet, subjects chose between two donation
embedded yogurts and a no-buy option. There were no yogurt product choices were
without a donation. As such, Iprivj , Ipubj , IPY O and IA are linearly dependent with V ,
so I set Iprivj as the baseline and αpriv drops out, simplifying the estimating equation
to:
uij = θvVij + θpPriceij − αpubκIpubijPriceij (1.6)
+βPY OIPY Oij
√
dj + βAIAij
√
d+ αpubIpubijdij + ij
with 0 < κ < 0.08 = κ10
The estimated random coefficient models fit the data better, so I focus my discussion
on Models 3 and 4. The benchmark Model 3 in Table 1.7 incorporates neither social
10 The highest value κ can take such that d−κp > 0 for all the data in the sample is κ = 0.10
1.29
= 0.08
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Table 1.7: Parameter Estimates - Yoplait Experiment 1
Fixed Coefficient Random Coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. Coeff. Coeff. Mean of SD of Mean of SD of
Choice=1 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Ind. Var.
θV 4.791 4.196 4.799 0.644 4.196 0.000
(.416)*** (.463)*** (.417)*** (.572) (.463)*** (.598)
θp -4.033 -4.788 -4.072 0.640 -4.788 0.549
(.385)*** (.440)*** (.388)*** (.690) (.440)*** (.693)
βPY O 4.281 4.281 0.000
(.753)*** (.753)*** (1.569)
βA 3.448 3.448 0.000
(.824)*** (.824)*** (1.371)
κ 0.000 0.000 -
(.000) (.000)
αpub -2.270 -2.270 0.000
(.635)*** (.635)*** (2.563)
N 1,530 1,530 1,530 1,530
LL -481.0 -461.0 -480.0 -460.1
AIB 966.0 934.0 968.0 942.2
BIC 976.7 966.0 989.3 1000.9
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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pressure nor warm glow from donations. I find that the average subject has positive
utility for Yoplait yogurt (θV = 4.799, p < 0.01) and that the mean price coefficient
is negative (θp = −4.072, p < 0.01). Model 4, which incorporates aversion to social
pressure and sensitivity to warm glow, fits the data better (see AIC and BIC Table
1.7). The average subject displays an aversion to social pressure (αpub = −2.270 < 0,
p < 0.01 - see Model 4 in Table 1.7). Regarding sensitivity to warm glow, I find that
subjects obtain utility from donations, and that such utility increases when subjects are
able to pick the target charity.(βPY O = 4.281 > βA = 3.448, both p < 0.01 - see Model
(4) in Table 1.7).
Rescaling the parameters by price, I find that a $0.10 donation to Project HOPE is
worth $0.22 in warm glow, which increases to $0.38 for a $0.30 donation to the same
charity. In comparison, a $0.30 donation to a charity chosen by the subject increases
willingness to pay by an additional $0.10. Turning to social pressure, a $1 donation
induces a cost of $0.42.
Yoplait Experiment 2. As in the first Yoplait study, I manipulated public versus
private and choose your charity versus an assigned charity across subjects in this study
with university students in a lab setting rather than the online setting presented above.
In another difference, the choice sets were redesigned. Specifically, the choice triplets
consisting of two yogurt products and the no-buy option also included yogurt products
without a donation in some sets. As such, the estimating equation for alternative j
observed by subject i given by:
uij = θvVij + θpPriceij − αpubκIpubijPriceij − αprivκIprivijPriceij (1.7)
+βAIAij
√
d+ βPY OIPY Oij
√
dj + αprivIprivijdij + αpubIpubijdij + ij
with 0 < κ < 0.08 = κ11
The estimated random coefficient models fit the data better, so I focus my discussion
on Models 3 and 4. Model 3 in Table 1.8 is a benchmark model where subjects feel no
social pressure or warm glow from donations. I find that the average subject has positive
utility for Yoplait yogurt (θV = 4.991, p < 0.01) and that the mean price coefficient
is negative (θp = −4.153, p < 0.01). Model 4 adds aversion to social pressure and
11 The highest value κ can take such that d−κp > 0 for all the data in the sample is κ = 0.10
1.29
= 0.08
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Table 1.8: Parameter Estimates - Yoplait Experiment 2
Fixed Coefficients Random Coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. Coeff. Coeff. Mean of SD of Mean of SD of
Choice=1 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Ind. Var.
θV 4.887 6.586 4.991 2.221 6.741 2.436
(.291)*** (.334)*** (.296)*** (.528)*** (.340)*** (.554)***
θp -4.171 -7.197 -4.153 1.361 -7.248 1.361
(.293)*** (.350)*** (.294)*** (.527)*** (.354)*** (.537)***
βA 6.265 6.322 0.489
(.753)*** (.757)*** (1.151)
βPY O 6.423 6.451 1.817
(.749)*** (.755)*** (1.274)
κ 0.000 0.000 -
(.000) (.000)
αpriv -3.039 -2.921 1.263
(1.373)** (1.401)** (2.414)
αpub -4.942 -5.041 3.593
(1.368)*** (1.357)*** (2.361)
N 3,904 3,904 3,904 3,904
LL -1166 -925.5 -1148.4 -904.36
AIB 2,336.0 1,865.0 2304.8 1,834.7
BIC 2,348.5 1,908.9 2329.9 1,916.2
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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sensitivity to warm glow. This model fits the data better (see AIC and BIC Table 1.8).
The average aversion to social pressure is higher when subjects’ behavior is more publicly
visible (αpub = −5.041 < αpriv = −2.921 < 0, both p < 0.01; significant difference with
p < 0.05 - see Model 4 in Table 1.8). Additionally, for sensitivity to warm glow, I
find that subjects obtain utility from donations, and that such utility increases when
subjects are able to pick the target charity (βPY O = 6.322 < βA = 6.451, both p < 0.01
- see Model (4) in Table 1.8).
Rescaling the parameters by price, I find that a $0.10 donation to Project HOPE
creates warm glow of $0.28; a $0.30 donation to the same charity creates $0.48 of warm
glow. In comparison, a $0.30 donation to a charity picked by the subject increases
warm glow by an additional $0.01. Turning to social pressure, a $1 donation on a social
media redemption site induces $0.70 in social pressure cost, while the same donation on
a private redemption site induces only $0.40 in social pressure cost.
1.2.4 General Discussion
Together, my empirical analyses suggest that the warm glow and social pressure evoked
by corporate donations embedded into products significantly impact consumers’ utility
and product choices. I find that a model incorporating these effects performs better
than a benchmark model without these effects. My estimates of the focal parameters
(viz. sensitivity to warm glow and aversion to social pressure) demonstrate statistical
and managerial relevance.
Across the experiments, I establish that donations beyond a threshold induce costs.
The threshold itself (relative to the price charged) is quite small, given that my esti-
mates of κ are close to 0 in all of the experiments. Thus, I conclude that many real
world donation campaigns create such costs. Furthermore, the cost induced by a spe-
cific donation level is contingent on features of the donation campaign. For instance,
identifying the product with the donation visibly magnifies these costs. In my data, a
visible or public $1 donation creates a social pressure cost equivalent to a price increase
of up to $0.70-almost twice as much as a donation made in a private or less visible
fashion. Pressuring buyers carries a cost in many circumstances, even when the cause
is worthwhile.
Turning to warm glow, I find that in the Kindle experiment, the value of donating
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the first dollar to the Susan G. Komen Foundation is approximately $4.08; in the first
Yoplait experiment it is $0.69 for donating the first dollar to Project HOPE and $0.89
for donating the first dollar to a charity picked by the subject; and in the second Yoplait
experiment it is $0.87 for donating the first dollar to Project HOPE and $0.89 for a char-
ity picked by the subject. Warm glow has widely different valuations between products.
The difference might be due to the different consumption utility of the products. For
a package of yogurt, a $1 donation is huge compared to the price, but it is a relatively
small donation for a the purchase of a durable, relatively more expensive Kindle reader.
It is possible that the $1 donation for yogurt would be in the decreasing return area of
the curve, while the $1 donation for the Kindle is still in the portion of the curve where
returns are more than proportional.
If we contrast more comparable donations, increasing the donation to the Susan G.
Komen Foundation on a Kindle from $5 to $6 is worth approximately $0.90 in warm
glow, while the value of increasing the donation to Project HOPE from $0.10 to $0.30
on a Yoplait yogurt is $0.16 in Experiment 2a and $0.20 in Experiment 2b. Moving the
$0.30 donation from Project HOPE to a charity picked by the subject is worth about
$0.10 for subjects in Experiment 2a and $0.01 for subjects in Experiment 2b. From these
results, it is clear that while warm glow increases with donations, a firm should carefully
calibrate its donations to avoid donating more than the warm glow it creates. Targeting
donations at customers’ preferred causes helps increase buyer’s perceived “bang for the
buck.”
Pulling these results together, we get a clearer picture of consumers’ reactions to
donation embedded products. The managerial implications of warm glow are relatively
straightforward. Principally, the decision-maker must fold into his calculus the dimin-
ishing response from each additional donation amount and calibrate donations carefully.
However, the concomitant social pressure effect arising from donations makes the do-
nation decision more complex. It is incorrect to infer that social pressure costs should
always deter a firm from undertaking campaigns that exert social pressure on its cus-
tomers. The net effect of warm glow and social pressure may be positive. Indeed, casual
empiricism discloses that many firms resort to social pressure. For instance, the “Pink
Ribbon” examples in Figure 1.1 are all instances in which the decision to use the highly
iconic color plainly induces social pressure costs. We need to pinpoint more precisely the
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circumstances under which a rational firm will choose actions that yield social pressure.
1.3 Firms’ Optimal Donation Embedding Strategy
Using the insights about warm glow and social pressure developed above, I develop an
analytical model of consumers’ response to corporate donations embedded into products
and examine firms’ reactions. In spite of its negative effect on consumers’ utility, aversion
to social pressure can be profit enhancing. The intuition is that social pressure decreases
sensitivity to price so that under some conditions, it allows firms to reap higher profits.
1.3.1 Model
Consider a duopoly model with no collusion between the firms. Consumers are uniformly
distributed along a Hotelling line on their preferences for the firm product, and firms
are located at the two endpoints (Firm 1 at x = 0 and Firm 2 at x = 1). For a consumer
located at x, utility for Firm 1’s product is given by:
U1 = v − tx− p1 + β
√
d1 − α(d1 − κp1)+ (1.8)
while utility for Firm 2’s product is given by:
U2 = v − t(1− x)− p2 + β
√
d2 − α(d2 − κp2)+ (1.9)
where
v is valuation of the product;
t is the transportation cost;
x is the distance between the consumer and the firm;
pi is the price set by firm i;
β is the sensitivity to warm glow;
di is the donation by firm i; and
α is the aversion to social pressure.
Hence, consumers differ on their preferences for the product, but not on their pref-
erences for the charity. I focus on this source of consumer heterogeneity because I am
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interested in understanding whether embedding donations can sway consumers’ pur-
chases away from competing products. I am also interested in whether firms can use
donation embedded products to gain a competitive advantage.12
Without loss of generality, I normalize the marginal cost for the product to 0 so that
firm i’s profits are given by:
pii = (pi − di)qi (1.10)
Firms decide simultaneously on donations and then, based on donations, they decide
on prices. Consumers then decide from which firm to buy. To find the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium, I solve the optimization problem backward, starting by solving for
quantities purchased. Quantity, qi, is computed by finding the location of the marginal
consumer who is indifferent between buying for Firm 1 and Firm 2. For such consumers,
U1 = U2. Solving for x when U1 = U2 yields:
q1 = 1− q2 =
β
(√
d1 −
√
d2
)− p1 + p2 − α(d1 − κp1)+ + α(d2 − κp2)+ + t
2t
(1.11)
Plugging 1.11 into 1.10, the profit function for firm i is given by:
pii = (pi − di)
β
(√
di −
√
dj
)− pi + pj − α(di − κpi)+ + α(dj − κpj)+ + t
2t
(1.12)
Once I account for quantities, profit depends not only on a firm’s own actions, but
also on its competitor’s actions. Quantities sold by Firm i are increasing in its own
donations and in the other firm’s prices, while they are decreasing in its own prices and
in the other firm’s donations.
Firms first decide on donations. Depending on donation level, four cases arise: 1)
no firm offers donation embedded products; 2) both firms offer donation embedded
products; 3) Firm 1 offers donation embedded products and Firm 2 does not; and 4)
12 I also solved a model in which consumers where heterogeneous on β. The main difference in
results between the current model and the model with consumers that are heterogeneous on β is that,
depending on circumstances, firms might decide to serve only part of the market. In a market in which
there is a high warm glow and a low warm glow segment of consumers, firms will decide to cater to
both segments or only to the high warm glow consumers depending on the size of each segment as well
as on the difference between the β of the two segments.
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Firm 2 offers donation embedded products and Firm 1 does not. To maximize profits,
I consider the four cases separately and compare the optimal solution across cases to
find the equilibrium strategies. Within each case, I solve backward and maximize firms’
profits first for prices, pi, then for donations, di. Finally, I compare the four cases to
find the equilibrium.
I find that in a duopoly where consumers are distributed along the Hotelling line,
equilibrium prices, warm glow, and profits are given by:
Lemma 1.1 For β2 > 4κ(1+α−ακ)
2t
(1−κ)(1−ακ) both firms offer donation embedded products, and
donations, prices, quantities and profits are given by:
d1 = d2 =
β2
4(α+ 1− ακ)2 ; p1 = p2 =
β2
4(1 + α− ακ)2 +
t
1− ακ (1.13)
q1 = q2 =
1
2
; pi1 = pi2 =
t
2(1− ακ)
For 4κ(1−κ) t ≤ β2 ≤ 4κ(1+α−ακ)
2t
(1−κ)(1−ακ) two equilibria exist:
d1 = d2 =
κt
1− κ ; p1 = p2 =
t
1− κ ; q1 = q2 =
1
2
; pi1 = pi2 =
t
2
(1.14)
or
d1 = d2 = 0; p1 = p2 = t; q1 = q2 =
1
2
; pi1 = pi2 =
t
2
(1.15)
Finally, for 0 < β2 < 4κ(1−κ) t and β
2 < 4κ(1+α−ακ)
2t
(1−κ)(1−ακ) , both firms offer donation
embedded products, and donations, prices, quantities, and profits are given by:
d1 = d2 =
β2
4
; p1 = p2 =
β2
4
+ t; q1 = q2 =
1
2
; pi1 = pi2 =
t
2
(1.16)
In Region 1, where warm glow is moderate, both firms offer donation embedded
products, and their profits are increasing in social pressure. In Region 2, there are
multiple equilibria, in which either both firms offer donation embedded products or
no firm offers donation embedded products. In this region, firms experience the same
profits, whether they both offer donation embedded products or neither offers such
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products. Finally, in Region 3, where warm glow is low, both firms offer donation
embedded products, and there is no social pressure.
Even in the duopoly case, it is convenient for profit maximizing firms to offer dona-
tion embedded products, so long as customers are sensitive to warm glow (i.e., β > 0).
There are regions in which social pressure arises in equilibrium, but such regions can
only exist if consumers appreciate the donation chosen by the firm (i.e., β >> 0). In-
tuitively, social pressure is only present in the high warm glow region because to have
social pressure, the price of the product has to be relatively low with respect to the
donation (i.e., di > κpi). However, as warm glow decreases, optimal donation decreases
faster than price. As a result, for any given κ, if sensitivity to warm glow is sufficiently
low, donations become smaller than κp and social pressure disappears. This crossover
happens at lower levels of warm glow sensitivity as κ decreases, but never happens if κ
is sufficiently small (i.e., κ → 0). The less consumers feel they are helping the firm in
its prosocial behavior, the more guilt they experience.
Proposition 1 For β2 > 4κ(1+α−ακ)
2t
(1−κ)(1−ακ) , firms’ prices and donations are decreasing in
terms of aversion to social pressure, α, while profits are increasing in terms of aversion
to social pressure, α.
Proof for this result is immediate and is not provided. Intuitively, as aversion to
social pressure increases, consumers appreciate donations less, but they are also less
sensitive to price. As a result, firms choose lower donations and lower prices. However,
because of the reduced sensitivity to price, firms do not have to lower prices as quickly
as donations. Hence, in this region, firms’ profits increase in social pressure, α. Inter-
estingly, in this region, profits from offering donation embedded products are strictly
higher than when neither firm offers donation embedded products13 . This is due to
the fact that social pressure softens price competition, thereby allowing firms to reap
higher profits.
Proposition 2 Firms’ prices and donations increase weakly in terms of sensitivity to
warm glow, β, while profits are independent of sensitivity to warm glow, β.
13 As shown in Appendix B, when both firms do not offer donation embedded products pi1 = pi2 =
t
2
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Proof for this result is immediate and is not provided. This result highlights another
interesting feature of a duopoly. While donations and profits are increasing in terms
of sensitivity to warm glow, β, profits operate independently from sensitivity to warm
glow. This is due to the competitive forces between firms, which prevent one firm from
unilaterally raising prices to appropriate the extra utility consumers experience from
warm glow. As a result, as sensitivity to social pressure, β, increases, firms provide
higher donations and raise their prices just enough to cover the cost of providing the
higher donation. If they were to raise their prices by more than their costs, other
firms could undercut them. Hence, when both firms offer donation embedded products
and social pressure is absent, firms cannot earn any additional profit from embedding
donations, and their profits are the same as when neither firm offers donation embedded
products.
1.3.2 Discussion
Overall, profit maximizing firms will choose to offer donation embedded products as long
as consumers care enough about warm glow. In addition, competition does not crowd
out donations nor does it prevent firm from applying social pressure. The interplay
between warm glow and social pressure is quite complex, and worth some reflection.
Basically, the strategy for competing firms is to offer donation embedded products,
at least as long as consumers care about the cause chosen by the firm; indeed, both
donations and prices increase for more well liked causes. The competitive pressure
keeps prices from rising faster than donations, so that profits are fixed in terms of warm
glow, but consumers’ utility is increasing in terms of sensitivity to warm glow. Note
that sensitivity to warm glow is the primary driver of donations: if consumers do not
experience warm glow (i.e., sensitivity to warm glow is β = 0), the optimal action for
the firm is to make no donations. When there are no donations, the firm does not
create social pressure on consumers because d = 0 ≤ κp. Hence, a firm’s actions do not
generate social pressure absent warm glow.
Aversion to social pressure does not make firms shy away from exerting such pressure.
When the charities are liked by consumers (i.e., sensitivity to warm glow β is high),
profits increase with aversion to social pressure. I conclude that a firm targeting well-
liked causes should increase social pressure. As mentioned above, the intuition for this
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result is that aversion to social pressure decreases sensitivity to price.
When firms are competing and consumers are sensitive to warm glow, β >> 0,
the equilibrium is for both firms to offer donation embedded products and aversion
to social pressure has a positive effect on firms’ profits. Indeed, while firms make no
higher profits by offering donation embedded products when there is no social pressure,
firms gain higher profits by offering donation embedded products when social pressure
is present.
My results shed some light on the “green-washing” charge often laid by activists who
accuse firms of being disingenuous about CSR. They argue that firms are not altruis-
tically inclined, they are simply acting to increase profits. I show that a rational (i.e.
profit-maximizing) firm is far-sighted enough to recognize and accommodate the social
preferences of its own customers. This effect survives competitive pressures despite the
cost-increasing aspect of embedded donations. I argue this is a desirable consequence.
1.4 Conclusion and Future Research
In this paper, I provide a new framework to evaluate CSR, specifically donations em-
bedded into products. In a series of experiments, I highlight how these donations appeal
to consumers through warm glow and social pressure. While warm glow has a positive
effect on consumers’ utility, social pressure has a negative effect. To the best of my
knowledge, this is the first attempt to show the effect of social pressure on consumer
and firm behavior in the context of a specific form of CSR, product embedded donations.
By using these insights on the drivers of CSR, I develop a model of firms’ and
consumers’ behavior and show that embedding products with donations can improve
profits. Additionally, I show that social pressure can be beneficial to firms, despite the
negative effect social pressure has on consumers. Aversion to social pressure appears
to reduce sensitivity to prices because, when consumers feel guilty for not doing the
“right thing,” they are willing to pay to make things right. This does not imply that
consumers like social pressure; instead, their buying behavior is increased because they
dislike it.
Moreover, in my estimation I am able to quantify the magnitude of the parameters
and compare them to dollar values. I find that the mean cost of social pressure is
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between a few cents and $0.70 for a $1 donation, while the benefit of the first dollar
of donation varies between $0.69 and $4.08, depending on the value of the product
embedded with the donation and the beneficiary of the donation. I find ample evidence
of consumers’ heterogeneity for aversion to social pressure.
I also highlight, both empirically and theoretically, how social pressure can impact
consumers’ utility and how this feature should inform firms’ behavior. By highlighting
the negative effects of social pressure after controlling for warm glow, I draw attention to
the importance of understanding social pressure and its effect on consumers’ behavior.
While social pressure has been studied as a way to increase compliance with social
desirable consumeption patterns (Griskevicius et al. 2010; Goldstein et al. 2008; Schultz
et al. 2007), little attention has been given to the potential cost of pressuring consumers
into respecting social norms (with the notable exceptions of Andreoni et al. 2012 and
Della Vigna et al. 2012).
By formalizing a utility representation for products associated with a donation,
including warm glow and social pressure, I extend the previous literature in multiple
ways. First, I provide a model to represent social pressure in interactions between a
firm and its customers. While peer-to-peer social pressure had been formalized before
in the context of contribution to public goods (Della Vigna et al. 2012), to the best of
my knowledge, I am the first to extend the concept to firms. Additionally, I extend the
CSR literature by using a richer utility function that considers both the positive and
negative effects of CSR.
From a managerial perspective, my model provides clear direction for practitioners
shaping their marketing actions to maximize profits. Marketers should offer donation
embedded products. In choosing the donation to embed, they should align the cause
with their consumers’ preferences to maximize the effect of warm glow. Finally, com-
panies should only resort to social pressure when the cause they choose can yield high
warm glow.
Some limitations remain. The empirical results of my study that quantify warm
glow sensitivity and social pressure aversion are based on stated preferences.While, I
demonstrate that social pressure induces exit from the choice setting, it is possible that
consumers in a real-world environment would make different choices than during an
experiment. It would be interesting to study the phenomenon using field experiments or
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firm data. I also impose a specific structure to the utility function. While this allows me
to solve for and get precise predictions for firm behavior, those predictions are predicated
on the functional form. Further work could relax some of the assumptions. For example,
the social pressure term in the utility function could incorporate an industry rather than
a firm-specific donation level as the reference point and could examine how changes in
the reference point can impact consumers’ and firms’ behavior.
Chapter 2
Fairness Ideals in Distribution
Channels
Research in behavioral and experimental economics suggests that concerns for fairness
impact a wide range of agents’ behaviors.1 Subjects in various versions of the
ultimatum and dictator games routinely offer higher than optimal shares of the initial
endowment, and responders virtually always turn down low offers that are significantly
higher than predicted by standard economic models (Camerer 2003).
Through consumer and company surveys meant to investigate what is considered
“fair” in circumstances ranging from price increases to renting contracts, researchers
have found that people largely agree on what is and is not fair. This suggests that
fairness is a widely understood concept (Anderson and Simester 2004, 2008, 2010; Gth,
Schmittberger, and Schwarze 1982; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986a, 1986b; Olm-
stead and Rhode 1985). Perhaps stemming from this shared understanding, empirical
evidence indicates that fairness or equity plays an important role in certain business
contexts (Heide and John 1992; Jap 2001; Jap and Anderson 2003; Kumar, Scheer,
and Steenkamp 1995; Olmsted and Rhode 1985; Scheer, Kumar, and Steenkamp 2003,
Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone 1998, Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995, etc.). For instance,
in a study that surveyed 417 American and 289 Dutch auto dealers, Scheer, Kumar,
1 A short list of research on this topic includes: Anderson and Simester 2004, 2008, 2010; Camerer
2003; Charness and Rabin 2002; Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt 2007; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Goldfard et
al. 2012; Gth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze 1982; Hackett 1994; Ho and Su 2009; Kahneman, Knetsch,
and Thaler 1986a, 1986b; Macneil 1980; Olmstead and Rhode 1985, and Rabin 1993.
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and Steenkamp (2003) found concerns for distributive fairness among business partners.
They also found that inequity plays a very different role for auto dealers across cul-
tures: American dealers react only to disadvantageous inequity, while Dutch dealers are
sensitive to unfairness whether it is a disadvantage or a boon to their own business.
There is also strong experimental support for fairness concerns among contracting
agents (Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt 2007; Hackett 1994; Loch and Wu 2008). Fehr,
Klein, and Schmidt (2007) have shown that bonus contracts that offer a voluntary and
unenforceable bonus for satisfactory performance provide powerful incentives. In fact,
they are superior to explicit incentive contracts for fair-minded players.
Other fields confirm this preference more widely. There is ample evidence in neu-
roscience and psychology suggesting that all human decision makers have an intrinsic
desire for fairness (Bechara and Damasio 2005; Koenigs et al. 2007; Sanfey et al. 2003;
Stephen and Pham 2008). Stephen and Pham (2008), in particular, have documented
how decision makers’ feelings of fairness and emotions play an important role in ulti-
matum games and negotiations.
Given the widely documented importance of fairness, theorists and practitioners have
called attention to the issue of understanding fairness as a top priority for developing
and maintaining healthy business relationships in distribution channels. Cui, Raju, and
Zhang (2007) model the effect of fairness concerns between manufacturers and retailers
in a dyadic channel with linear demand. In their work, the manufacturer can use a single
wholesale price to coordinate the channel-so long as the retailer has strong concerns for
fairness. That is, the double marginalization problem can be avoided in a fair channel.
Caliskan-Demirag, Chen, and Li (2010) extend Cui, Raju, and Zhang’s work (2007) to
consider non-linear demand functions. This team finds that a linear wholesale price
can coordinate the channel at a wider range when the retailer is fair-minded. And,
more recently, Pavlov and Katok (2011) affirmed that a linear pricing contract can still
maximize the channel profit even when there is information asymmetry between channel
members about fairness concerns. The importance of fairness to a healthy relationship
among channel members is documented and analyzed time and time again.2
2 The research includes: Anderson and Weitz 1992; Caliskan-Demirag, Chen, and Li 2010; Corsten
and Kumar 2003, 2005; Frazier 1983; Hackett 1994; Katok and Wu 2009; Kaufmann and Stern 1988;
Kumar 1996; Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995; Loch and Wu 2008; Macneil 1980; McCharty 1985;
Meyer et al. 2010; Olmstead and Rhode 1985; Scheer, Kumar, and Steenkamp 2003.
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Although previous research has generated extensive useful insights on how fairness
affects channel interactions, several important questions remain. How strong are fairness
concerns in a channel? What principle guides the determination of the equitable payoff
(i.e., what is considered a “fair deal”)? And, if a firm’s decision deviates from standard
economic models’ predictions, can we chalk it up to the decision maker’s dedication to
fairness or could it be bounded rationality restricting optimal choices?
In order to better understand these issues, I experimentally investigate theoretical
predictions regarding prices in a dyadic channel in which the manufacturer acts as a
Stackelberg leader in choosing prices and the retailer acts as a follower. From this,
I build a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) model (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995)
that incorporates both the retailer’s concerns for fairness and the bounded rationality
affecting both firms to explain the discrepancy between the theoretical predictions and
empirical regularities. The behavioral model nests the standard economic model as a
special case. Through this enriched model, I am able to investigate how equitable payoffs
are determined in a fair channel. I estimate the behavioral model from experimental
data using maximum likelihood methods.
This research makes the following contributions to the extant literature: 1) I pro-
vide empirical evidence that fairness matters in distribution channels and I estimate its
relevance. The estimation results suggest significant fairness concerns in channels. 2)
I show that fairness concerns identify well entrenched preferences, and are not simply
an artifact of bounded rationality. I use a two-sided QRE specification to study the
bounded rationality of both the manufacturer and retailer and distinguish it from be-
havioral concerns for fairness. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first research
that analyzes the bounded rationality of both players in a dyadic channel, and it allows
me to quantify bounded rationality and fairness using experimental data from incentive
aligned experimental studies. 3) I investigate how a fair split of profits is determined.
This is the first study to use empirical evidence regarding what is considered a fair
deal in the pricing game of a distribution channel. In particular, I examine what con-
stitutes an equitable division of profit between the retailer and the manufacturer by
comparing three fairness principles-strict egalitarianism, liberal egalitarianism, and lib-
ertarianism (Cappelen et al. 2007)-against a proposed new principle of fairness: the
sequence-aligned ideal. This new principle reflects the power structure in the dyadic
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channel and proposes that the equitable payoff should be consistent with the ratio of
players’ profits in the standard Stackelberg game. Hence, this fairness principle can be
seen as reflecting an important element in distribution channels: their power structure.
4) I show that the proposed sequence-aligned ideal performs best in experimental de-
terminations of what is considered fair in a channel. This suggests that, in the context
of channel relations, it is perceived as “fair” for the more powerful firm (in this model,
the manufacturer acting as the Stackelberg leader) to obtain a higher payoff than the
less powerful firm (the retailer acting as a follower). This finding reveals how power
influences channel members’ beliefs about deserved profits and how such beliefs affect
decisions and eventually guide the realization of profits for the channel.
This chapter owes a great debt to Cappelen et al. (2007), who studied the three
fairness ideals in a dictator distribution game in which the outputs of a production
stage might determine the equitable payoff. It diverges, however, in three important
ways: 1) This research presents a behavioral model that incorporates both bounded
rationality and fairness concerns. The addition of bounded rationality allows me to
better distinguish between deviations from rational decisions due to subjects’ mistakes
and deviations due to fairness concerns. 2) I propose an alternate fairness ideal, the
sequence-aligned ideal, which generalizes the concept of strict egalitarianism. This ideal
is particularly suited to the channel context because it can capture power differentials
between channel members. Indeed, I show that the newly proposed fairness ideal out-
performs other fairness ideals in experimental studies. 3) In this paper, players in a
dyadic channel make pricing decisions in the second stage of the game, while in Cappe-
len et al. (2007), the dictator decides how much currency to give the passive receiver
in the second stage. The active role of the retailer, who decides on a retail price in the
second stage of the game and can punish the manufacturer for unfair behaviors, not
only provides a more realistic setting but also forces manufacturers to carefully consider
retailers’ preferences and concerns about fairness. Additionally, the setting in this paper
is more closely related to the dyadic channel structure widely studied in marketing and
pricing literature.
My study further contributes to the literature on incorporating behavioral theories
into quantitative marketing models to better understand how firms’ decisions may be
affected by certain behavioral factors. Past studies have concerned cognitive hierarchy
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(Camerer, Ho, and Chong 2004; Goldfarb and Xiao 2011; Goldfarb and Yang 2009), fair-
ness concerns (Chen and Cui 2012; Cui, Raju, and Shi 2012; Cui, Raju, and Zhang 2007;
Feinberg, Krishna, and Zhang 2002), bounded rationality (Che, Sudhir, and Seethara-
man 2007; Chen, Iyer, and Pazgal 2010), loss and/or risk aversion (Hardie, Johnson,
and Fader 1993; Kalra and Shi 2010), regret or counterfactual considerations (Lim and
Ho 2007; Syam, Krishnamurthy, and Hess 2008), reference dependency (Amaldoss and
Jain 2010; Ho and Zhang 2008; Orhun 2009), emotions (Sanfey et al. 2003; Stephen and
Pham 2008), and learning (Amaldoss and Jain 2005; Amaldoss, Bettman, and Payne
2008; Bradlow, Hu, and Ho 2004a,b; Chen, Su, and Zhao 2012; Ho and Weigelt 1996).
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I outline the standard
economic model and present theoretical predictions about prices and investments. In
subsequent sections, I describe the experimental design and report results. Then, I
outline a behavioral model that incorporates both bounded rationality and fairness
concerns by channel members. The results of the estimated model are also described in
the section. I conclude with main findings and directions for future research.
2.1 Standard Economic Model
The standard economic model provides the theoretical predictions of the investments
and prices that channel members will choose when they are rational profit maximizers.
Consider the standard dyadic channel, in which a single manufacturer sells its product
through a single retailer. There are two stages of pricing. Each firm has an initial
endowment of E at the beginning of the first stage. In stage one, both manufacturer and
retailer simultaneously decide how much of their initial endowment E they would like to
invest to increase the demand for the product. I denote IM ≤ E as the manufacturer’s
investment and IR ≤ E as the retailer’s investment. Given their investments, the
manufacturer moves first to charge a constant wholesale price w. Taking the wholesale
price w as given, the retailer then sets the retail price p. Without loss of generality,
I assume that production cost c is zero. Market demand is given by D(p) = BD −
b ∗ p = a + IM ∗ RM + IR ∗ RR − b ∗ p, where BD = a + IM ∗ RM + IR ∗ RRrefers
to the base demand of the product, RM > 0 (RR > 0) represents the rate of return
for the manufacturer’s (retailer’s) investment, and b > 0. I denote piM = w ∗ D(p)
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as the manufacturer’s profit from sales of products and piR = (p − w) ∗ D(p) as the
retailer’s profit from sales of products. Thus, the manufacturer’s total profit is given by
ΠM (IM , w) = E − IM + piM = E − IM +w ∗D(p) and the retailer’s total profit is given
by ΠR(IR p) = E − IR + piR = E − IR + (p− w) ∗D(p).
I solve the model with backward induction. Detailed proofs are given in Appendix A.
I first solve the sequential pricing game given any investments by the manufacturer and
retailer. Firms’ investments are then solved given firms’ price decisions as a function of
firms’ investments. Given investments IM and IR, the optimal wholesale price is given
by w(IM , IR) =
a+IMRM+IRRR
2b , and the optimal retail price is given by p(IM , IR) =
3(a+IMRM+IRRR)
4b . Given firms’ best-response prices and the other firm’s investment, a
firm’s profit is a convex function of its investment, and the optimal investments are
given by
(I∗M , I
∗
R) =

(0, 0) if 0 < RM < RM1 and 0 < RR < RR1
(0, E) if 0 < RM < RM2 and RR ≥ RR1
(E, 0) if RM ≥ RM1 and 0 < RR < RR2
(E,E) if RM ≥ RM3 and RR ≥ RR3
(2.1)
The threshold values of return rates are defined as RM1 =
1
E (
√
a2 + 8bE − a),
RR1 =
1
E (
√
a2 + 16bE − a), RM2 solved from ΦM (RM2, RR) = 0, RR2 solved from
ΦR(RM , RR2) = 0 and RM3 and RR3 simultaneously solved from ΦM (RM3, RR3) = 0
and ΦR(RM3, RR3) = 0, where the functions ΦM and ΦR are given by{
ΦM (x, y) = E · x2 + 2(a+ E · y)x− 8b
ΦR(x, y) = E · y2 + 2(a+ E · x)y − 16b
(2.2)
2.2 The Experiment
Human subjects were recruited to act in the role of either the manufacturer or the
retailer. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of four treatment conditions shown
in Table 2.1. In each round, each player was matched with another player taking the
opposite role. They played the first half of the rounds in the role of the manufacturer
(retailer) and the second half in the role of the retailer (manufacturer). In the first
stage of each round, the two players in the same channel simultaneously decided on the
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investments out of their initial endowment of E = 10 pesos. As I was interested in
understanding how players determined an equitable payoff, the return rates were varied
across conditions so that the return rate for the investments could be either .2 or 1.2.
This variation allows me to differentiate between the effect of the contribution to the
channel that is under the agents’ control (i.e., the investments) and the effect of the
contribution that is outside the agent’s control (i.e., the effective return on investment
as affected by the exogenously given return rates). The values of the return rates were
selected so that the optimal investment decision for a profit maximizing agent would
always be to invest the entire endowment when facing a high return rate of 1.2 and
never to invest anything when facing a low return rate of .2, regardless of the other
agent’s decision and return rate.
In the second stage of the study, the player acting as the manufacturer decided on
the wholesale price first. The player acting as the retailer was a follower, only setting the
retail price after seeing the wholesale price. In the experiments, the available investment
levels were 0, 5, and 10 pesos a = b = 1. Table 2.1 shows the theoretical predictions of
investments and prices.
Table 2.1: Prediction of the Standard Economic Model
Retailer
RR = 1.2 RR = .2
Manufacturer
RM = 1.2
10.00, 10.00 10.00, 0
12.50, 18.75 7.50, 10.75
RM = .2
0, 10.00 0, 0
7.50, 10.75 .50, .75
Note: The first (second) number in each row in a cell refers to the
decision by the manufacturer (retailer). The first row shows investments
and the second row shows prices.
A total of 154 undergraduate students from a large, public, Midwestern university
took part in the experiments. They received cash payments contingent on their per-
formance in the experiments. Each session consisted of approximately 20 subjects and
lasted for 75 minutes. Subjects played two trial rounds to familiarize themselves with the
game. Roles were randomly assigned at the beginning of the experiment and switched
48
after half the rounds were played (e.g., a subject assigned to retailer in round 1 would
play as the retailer for the first half of the session and as manufacturer for the second
half of the game). In each round, each subject was matched with a subject playing the
opposite role. Subjects knew assignment was randomized and changed at every round,
and they did not know with whom they would be paired. This setting let me control
for both the reputation effect and players’ long-term strategic considerations. I later
show the robustness of the findings in repeated games in which each subject interacts
repeatedly with a fixed partner.
The experimental procedure was as follows. At the beginning of a session, subjects
were given a copy of the instructions and the researcher read the instructions aloud
3 . The researcher then answered any questions. At the beginning of each round,
each participant was informed of her role for that round. Then, players simultaneously
decided how much of the endowment to invest in the channel. As discussed above,
players could choose to invest 0, 5, or 10 out of their total endowment of 10 pesos. After
investments were decided, players were informed about the amount of the investments,
IM and IR, and the amount of baseline demand, 1 + IM ∗RM + IR ∗RR.
In the pricing stage, the manufacturer acted as a Stackelberg leader, moving first
to decide on a wholesale price, w, based on investments and baseline demand. The
retailer then moved to decide on retail price, p, based on investments, baseline demand,
and wholesale price. The quantity sold was determined based on the demand function
D(p) = 1 + IM ∗ RM + IR ∗ RR − p. For each unit sold, the manufacturer earned w
pesos and the retailer earned p−w pesos. After the quantity sold was determined, both
firms’ profits were calculated and communicated to both players. If any firm invested
less than the initial endowment, the residual endowment was also added to that firm’s
final profit.
Subjects were paid a show up fee of $5 and a performance based sum computed
by summing payoffs from each experimental round and then converting them to US
dollars at a fixed rate. The total payment for each subject, including the show up fee,
ranged between $15 and $25. The average payment to subjects was approximately $20.
Subjects were paid in cash at the end of each session. The experiments were conducted
3 See Appendix B for the instructions used in experiment 2 with RM = .2 and RR = .2. The
instructions for other conditions are available from the authors upon request.
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using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).
2.3 Experimental Results
Given this experimental setup, it is easy to compute equilibrium investments and equilib-
rium prices for profit maximizing agents. Figure 2.1 reports the optimal and the actual
investment choice observed in the experiment for retailers, while Figure 2.2 reports the
optimal and the actual investment choice observed for manufacturers. Subjects’ de-
cisions appear to systematically deviate from the equilibrium predictions. Depending
on role and condition, about 40% to 60% of subjects do not choose the equilibrium
investment level.
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Investment Retailer
RR=.2 RR=1.2
Optimal Actual
Figure 2.1: Optimal and Actual Investment Choices for Retailers
Similarly, Figure 2.3 shows the ratio between the actual prices chosen by subjects
and the prices predicted by the standard economic model. The optimal prices were
computed by taking into account the actual investments and, for the optimal retail
price, the actual wholesale price. Looking at Figure 2.3, it is evident that subjects
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Figure 2.2: Optimal and Actual Investment Choices for Manufacturers
deviate from the optimal prices and that they have a tendency to overprice. In fact, the
t-tests (Table 2.2) indicate a significant difference between the optimal prices and the
actual prices. This confirms that the prices set by players are significantly higher than
the optimal prices, even after accounting for actual investments and actual wholesale
prices.
Since I had specifically set out to study fairness, I also examined my experimental
results for any instances of “punishment”. I reasoned that, if players had concerns for
fairness, they would react to an unfair decision by punishing the other channel member 4
. I defined a pricing decision as “punishment” if a player chose a price that brought the
demand of the product to zero. Note that such punishment action effectively reduces
the earnings of both players to zero. Not only is the action costly for the person being
“punished”, but also for the player doing the punishing. A rational profit maximizing
4 This intuition was prompted by informal debriefing talks with subjects. When asked why they
choose such high prices, subjects replied that it was their way of punishing the other player for charging
a high wholesale price.
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Figure 2.3: Ratio of Actual Prices to Optimal Prices
player should never choose to “punish”, as it would only decrease her profit.
I run two logistic regressions to identify concerns of fairness by capturing the deter-
minant of punishment.
Pr(PunishmentM ) =
e
δ0M+δ2M
IM
IM+IR
+δ3M
IMRM
IMRM+IRRR
+CiδCiM
1 + e
δ0M+δ2M
IM
IM+IR
δ3M
IMRM
IMRM+IRRR
+CiδCiM
(2.3)
In the first regression, the probability of manufacturer punishing the retailer is cap-
tured by Equation 2.3, where PunishmentM is a dummy variable capturing punishment
from the manufacturer (equal to one when manufacturer chooses a wholesale price equal
to the baseline demand and zero otherwise). IMIM+IR captures the ratio of manufacturer
investment to total investment, IMRMIMRM+IRRR captures the ratio of manufacturer con-
tribution to the demand to total contribution to the demand, and Ci is a vector of
dummies capturing the experimental condition.5
5 The baseline condition is RR = 0.2 and RM = 0.2, while for C1 RR = 0.2 and RM = 1.2, for C2
RR = 1.2 and RM = 0.2, and C3 RR = 1.2 and RM = 1.2.
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Table 2.2: Optimal and Actual Prices Given Actual Investments
Retailer
RR = 1.2 RR = .2
Manufacturer w p w p
RM = 1.2
Optimal Price 8.65 13.52 4.91 7.57
Standard Deviation 3.18 4.87 2.43 3.66
Actual Price 9.73 13.92 5.32 7.89
Standard Deviation 4.23 5.20 3.07 4.06
t-test -6.34*** -3.55*** -3.43*** -4.28***
RM = .2
Optimal Price 3.66 5.75 .78 1.32
Standard Deviation 2.53 4.01 .41 .72
Actual Price 4.18 5.86 1.09 1.39
Standard Deviation 3.39 4.15 .73 .76
t-test -5.10*** -2.28** -11.19*** -5.09***
**significant at .05 confidence level ***significant at .01 confidence level.
Pr(PunishmentR) =
e
δ0R+δ1R
wˆ
w∗ +δ2R
IM
IM+IR
+δ3R
IMRM
IMRM+IRRR
+CiδCiR
1 + e
δ0R+δ1R
wˆ
w∗+δ2R
IM
IM+IR
+δ3R
IMRM
IMRM+IRRR
+CiδCiR
(2.4)
In the second retailer regression, the probability of the retailer punishing the man-
ufacturer is captured in Equation 2.4, and only the instances in which there was no
previous punishment from the manufacturer were considered. Similarly, PunishmentR
is a dummy variable that captures punishment from the retailer, which is equal to one
when the retailer chooses a retail price equal to the baseline demand and zero otherwise.
The regressors are the same as for the manufacturer regression. In addition, I included
a term capturing the magnitude of the manufacturer’s deviation from the optimal price,
wˆ
w∗ (the ratio of the actual price chosen by the manufacturer to the optimal price given
the baseline demand).
I find that manufacturers resort to punishment in 20% of their decisions, while re-
tailers punish in about 22% of those decision instances in which they have not been
punished. Moreover, I find (Table 2.3) that both δ2 and δ3 are not significant (i.e., nei-
ther investments nor contribution to demand have an impact on punishment decisions).
The decision to punish other players despite its costly consequences suggests that
53
Table 2.3: Predictors of Punishment
DV PunishmentM PunishmentR
Coeff. Coeff
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
δ1 - 1.744
(.194)***
δ2 0.0192 -0.532
(.618) (.632)
δ3 -0.579 0.720
(.623) (.670)
δC1 -0.854 -0.631
(.192)*** (.240)***
δC2 -1.233 -0.682
(.185)*** (.229)***
δC3 -2.414 -1.519
(.272)*** (.235)***
δ0 -0.161 -2.619
(.155) (.304)***
Observations 1,468 1,167
Log Likelihood -676.4 -551.9
AIC 1364.72 1117.76
BIC 1396.47 1153.2
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
players are not purely self-interested. In addition, the significance of δ1 implies that
the retailer’s punishment is a rather systematic consequence of manufacturer’s action.
The retailer becomes more likely to punish the more the manufacturer deviates upward
from optimal wholesale price. This systematic behavior suggests that punishment is
retaliation for a manufacturer’s attempts to take advantage of the first-mover role and
spurring the retailer to perceive the decision as unfair.
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2.4 Capturing Empirical Regularities
The experimental data shows that both wholesale and retail prices are significantly
different from the predictions of the standard economic model and that channel mem-
bers are willing to punish each other even when such punishment is costly. I explain
these results by generalizing the standard economic model to incorporate fairness con-
cerns that can affect the interactions between channel members (Kumar 1996; Kumar,
Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995; Loch and Wu 2008). Beyond fairness concerns, another
possible reason for players to set prices that deviate from the standard economic model
is bounded rationality. That is, these players are trying to maximize profits, but they
are making mistakes in their decisions. In order to identify bounded rationality in price
decision making, I employ the Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) model (McKelvey
and Palfrey 1995).
I start with a discussion of the fairness ideals which determine the equitable payoff for
a fair-minded firm. Next I analyze the QRE model that incorporates fairness concerns
expressed by different fairness ideals. Finally, I estimate the QRE model with fairness
concerns using the experimental data.
2.4.1 Fairness Ideals
I use the model of distributive fairness (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) to conceptualize fairness
concerns between channel members (Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995; Cui, Raju,
and Zhang 2007). A firm with concerns for distributive fairness experiences disutility
from inequity in the allocation of payoffs. The negative effect of inequity is stronger
when the firm has a lower payoff compared with its equitable payoff (i.e., when a dis-
advantageous inequity occurs) than when the firm has a higher payoff (i.e., when an
advantageous inequity occurs). The equitable payoff is the amount of monetary payoff
a firm considers a fair deal.
I follow Cui, Raju, and Zhang (2007) by assuming that the retailer in the channel
displays concerns for fairness, while the manufacturer is a profit maximizer. The man-
ufacturer’s and retailer’s payoffs from sales of product are denoted, respectively, as piM
and piR, the retailer’s utility is given by
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UR = ΠR − α ·max{ τ
1− τ piM − piR, 0} − β ·max{piR −
τ
1− τ piM , 0} (2.5)
for α ≥ β and 0 < β < 1.6 The terms in parentheses are used to distinguish
between advantageous and disadvantageous inequity. To represent an agent that is more
adverse to disadvantageous inequity than advantageous inequity, it is further assumed
that α ≥ β.
In the utility function, different τ1−τ values represent different fairness ideals. The
fairness ideal captures how a player’s equitable payoff is determined. What is considered
fair by players can vary as a result of social norms and power structure, as well as from
the contributions of the players to the final payoff. Our experimental setup, in which
the investments of different players affect both the base demand for the product and the
firms’ profits, is similar to an economy with investment-dependent market demands. In
such a context, what is considered a fair profit allocation can depend on the concept
I use to define fairness-the so-called fairness ideal. The three most prominent fairness
ideals studied in earlier literature are strict libertarianism, strict egalitarianism, and
liberal egalitarianism (Cappelen et al. 2007). The new construct is tested by this study.
Strict egalitarianism claims that agents should get the same share of the final out-
come, regardless of their respective contributions. Strict libertarianism argues that
agents’ payoffs should be in agreement with their total contributions, including the
factors under their control (i.e., investments) and factors outside of their control (i.e.,
return rates on investments). Liberal egalitarianism takes a middle ground, arguing
that agents’ final profits should be divided in proportion to the contributions that are
under their control (in this case, investments).
The newly proposed fourth fairness ideal, the sequence-aligned ideal, posits that the
players’ payoff should be consonant with the share of channel profit it would obtain
in the standard Stackelberg pricing model, in which the manufacturer and the retailer
sequentially set prices to maximize respective profits. Therefore, when the manufacturer
is the Stackelberg leader in a pricing game, the equitable payoff for the retailer would
6 I assume the retailer compares profit from sales of product piR with equitable payoff
τ
1−τ piM , which
is also a function of the manufacturer’s profit from sales of products. Firms’ pricing decisions in the
pricing stage will affect only their profits from sales of product, given their investment amounts. The
residual of endowment, E − Ij (with j = M,R), on the other hand, is independent of firms’ pricing
decisions.
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be one-third of the total channel profit or one-half of the manufacturer’s profit. The
higher profit for the Stackelberg leader comes from its power advantage relative to the
follower. The sequence-aligned ideal indicates that the equitable payoffs for the firms
should be consistent with the channel’s power structure in the channel. This is, to my
knowledge, the first research empirically testing how power structure in channel affects
the formation of equitable payoffs.
Note that the strict egalitarian ideal can be seen as a special case of the sequence-
aligned ideal. When firms have equal power in the channel, they deserve an equal share
of the total profit under the sequence-aligned ideal. This division of profits that coincides
with the split under the strict egalitarian ideal. Hence, the use of a Stackelberg game
is essential to separate the strict egalitarian and the sequence-aligned ideal.
Given the experimental design, each of all the fairness ideals can be represented by
a unique value of τ .7 A value of τ = 12 corresponds to the strict egalitarian ideal. This
is because the retailer’s equitable payoff is equal to the manufacturer’s profit from sales
of product (i.e., τ1−τ piM = piM , when τ =
1
2). A value of τ =
1
3 will successfully represent
the sequence-aligned ideal in a standard Stackelberg pricing game since τ1−τ piM =
piM
2
for τ = 13 (i.e., the retailer’s equitable payoff is proportional to its payoff in a standard
Stackelberg game). In a similar fashion, I can show that the value of τ with the liberal
egalitarian ideal is given by
τ =
{
1
2 if IM = IR = 0
IR
IM+IR
otherwise
,
and the value of τ with the strict libertarian ideal is given by
τ =
{
1
2 if IM = IR = 0
IR·RR
IM ·RM+IR·RR otherwise
.
In 2.4, I summarize these four fairness ideals for ease of reference. Note that both
the strict egalitarian ideal and the sequence-aligned ideal generate equitable payoffs are
independent of firms’ investments, while the retailer’s equitable payoffs under both the
liberal egalitarian ideal and the strict egalitarian ideal depend on both firms’ payoffs,
which are affected by their investments.
7 Since α and β measure the degree of fairness concerns for a decision maker but not his belief about
what kind of deal is fair, they are independent of the fairness ideal. Therefore, I cannot use parameters
α and β to test different fairness ideals.
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Table 2.4: Fairness Ideals
Fairness Ideals τ
Sequence-Aligned 13
Strict Egalitarian 12
Liberal Egalitarian
1
2 , if IM = IR = 0;
IR
IM+IR
, otherwise
Strict Libertarian
1
2 , if IM = IR = 0;
IR·RR
IM ·RM+IR·RR , otherwise
2.4.2 Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) Model with Fairness Ide-
als
It is worth pointing out the importance of bounded rationality in our behavioral model
of fairness. Both bounded rationality and fairness concerns may spur players to deviate
from optimal decisions. To discover whether fairness is simply an artifact of a deviation
from perfect rationality or is an intrinsic preference by the players, I need to figure out
whether fairness concerns survive after controlling for bounded rationality. In order to
solve this issue, I use a QRE model to capture the deviations from perfect rationality by
channel members (Chen, et al. 2012; McKelvey and Palfrey 1995; Ho and Zhang 2008;
Lim and Ho 2007). Using a QRE model allows me to answer the following questions: 1)
What is the driving force behind deviations in players’ decisions? 2) Can I differentiate
fairness concerns and bounded rationality and quantify each? 3) Are the manufacturer
and retailer both equally affected by bounded rationality in the game?
The key idea of the QRE framework is that decision makers will not always make
the optimal decision, but they will make better decisions more often. This idea can be
operationalized using a logit model. If I assume that decision makers make suboptimal
choices that are subject to random errors that are i.i.d. as an extreme value distribu-
tion, then the probability of choosing any given option can be computed using a logit
specification. More specifically, the probability for the retailer to choose a retail price
at level pj is given by
prob(p = pj) =
eλRUR(pj)∑
k e
λRUR(pk)
(2.6)
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where the parameter λR refers to the retailer’s degree of Nash rationality and in-
creases as the retailer becomes more rational. It can be easily proven that when λR = 0,
the probabilities of the retailer choosing each price level are the same; the retailer is
randomly choosing a price level. Intuitively, this happens because the weight attached
to the utility carried by each choice is zero. On the contrary, when λR =∞, the retailer
will choose the optimal price level with a probability of one. In fact, in contrast to the
case where λR = 0, in this case the weight attached to the utility carried by each choice
is infinity; the choice with the highest utility will always be selected.
Hence, the QRE specification nests both perfect rationality and random choice in a
flexible specification. It also has the advantage of requiring only minimal assumptions on
the behavioral data. In fact, while the QRE specification requires the econometrician
to compute and compare the exact utility yielded by each alternative observed by a
player, it only assumes that players choose a better alternative more often than a worse
alternative.
2.4.3 Estimation and Results
I develop a series of models to estimate fairness and QRE parameters using the data
from the pricing stage. I can group the models into two categories: 1) the base model in
which both agents are boundedly rational and don’t learn over time, and 2) the learning
model in which both agents are boundedly rational and learn over time.
Since using a QRE specification requires discrete data and the prices in this model
are continuous, I separate the data into three equally sized intervals and use the central
value of each bin to compute profits and utility.8 For example, since the feasible
range for the retail price is between w and BD, the three available bins for the retail
price are: 1) w to BD−w3 ; 2)
BD−w
3 to
2(BD−w)
3 ; and 3)
2(BD−w)
3 to BD. If the retailer
chose a price in the first interval, I usedp = BD−w6 ; the second bin, p =
BD−w
2 ; and the
third bin, p = 5(BD−w)6 . I divide the intervals into equally sized bins instead of using
distributional characteristics (e.g., percentiles) because each observation has a different
pricing space, making it difficult to determine valid cutoff points for the whole sample.
I summarize the notation used for the parameters in Table 2.5.
8 I also vary the number of intervals used to discretize the variables by using 3, 5, 7, and 9 intervals
to discretize the retail price. This does not reveal any significant differences between the models.
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Table 2.5: Notation of Estimation Results
λR QRE parameter of the retailer
λM QRE parameter of the manufacturer
α Parameter of disadvantageous inequity
β Parameter of advantageous inequity
τ Parameter of fairness ideal
Base model To understand whether and how fairness impacts subjects’ pricing de-
cisions, I first estimated a base model using data from the pricing stage and assuming
the manufacturer and retailer are both boundedly rational. Note that when the manu-
facturer decides on the wholesale price w, she does not know for sure what retail price,
p, will be chosen by the boundedly rational retailer. As a result, the manufacturer
must make a decision based on her expected profit from each possible wholesale price
level. On the contrary, when the retailer chooses the retail price, the wholesale price is
already known. Hence, the manufacturer faces a more complicated decision. Under this
framework, the log-likelihood for the estimation can be represented as follows,
LL = LLM + LLR (2.7)
where
LLM =
∑
n
∑
i y
w=wi log(prob(w = wi)) =
∑
n
∑
i y
w=wi log( e
λMEpiM (wi|pj)∑
k e
λMEpiM (wk|pj) )
=
∑
n
∑
i y
w=wi log( e
λM
∑
j prob(p=pj)·piM (wi|pj)∑
k e
λM
∑
j prob(p=pj)·piM (wk|pj) )
(2.8)
and
LLR =
∑
n
∑
j y
p=pj log(prob(p = pj)) =
∑
n
∑
j y
p=pj log( e
λRUR(pj)∑
k e
λRUR(pk)
) (2.9)
Here UR is the utility given by Equation 2.5, piM = D(p) ∗ w, and λM and λR are,
respectively, the QRE parameters for the manufacturer and the retailer.9 Note that
9 I estimated the maximum likelihood using the fmincon routine in Matlab. Parameters were
restricted to respect the assumptions of the theory (α ≥ β ≥ 0, λR ≥ 0, and λM ≥ 0)
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the probabilities of different retail prices affect the probabilities of the manufacturer
choosing different wholesale prices. This requires simultaneously estimating the log-
likelihoods for both manufacturer and retailer (i.e., LLM and LLR).
In my analysis, I estimated different variants of this base model. First, I ran a model
with no concerns for fairness and used it as a baseline to check whether considering
fairness concerns improved the explanatory power of the model. Next, I ran the four
models corresponding to the four different fairness ideals.
The estimation results are presented in Table 2.6. As you can see, all of the models
that account for fairness have a significantly better fit than the baseline model. The AIC
and BIC values suggest that the fairness ideal best capturing subjects’ behaviors is the
sequence-aligned ideal. This suggests that there are significant concerns for distributive
fairness in a channel where both players are boundedly rational.
Table 2.6: Estimation Results of the Base Model
α = β = 0 Sequence- Strict Liberal Strictly
Aligned Egalitarian Egalitarian Libertarian
λR .10 .08 .08 .08 .08
(.01)*** (.01)*** (.01)*** (.01)*** (.01)***
λM .02 .02 .02 .02 .02
(.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)*** (.00)***
α .39 .14 .07 .01
(.10)*** (.04)*** (.03)** (.01)
β .10 -.38 -.67 -.71
(.15) (.23)* (.26)*** (.26)***
Observations 4404 4404 4404 4404 4404
LL -3131.8 -3117.23 -3119.93 -3124.45 -3125.7
vs. α = β = 0 - 29.14*** 23.74*** 14.7*** 12.2**
AIC 6267.60 6242.46 6247.86 6256.90 6259.40
BIC 6280.38 6268.02 6273.42 6282.46 6284.96
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The parameter of disadvantageous inequity α is equal to .39 and is significantly
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different from zero in the sequence-aligned model (p < .01). The parameter of advan-
tageous inequity β is given by .10, directional but insignificant (p = .50). Note that the
manufacturers’ beliefs on retailers’ preference play a role in the estimated parameters,
hence the insignificant result might be due to manufacturers believing that retailers do
not care about advantageous inequality (i.e., manufacturers assume that retailers will
not be concerned by unfairness if it results in higher retailer profits).
Since both α and β are positive, the data suggests that an increase in inequity
decreases retailer’s utility (see Equation 2.5) and players do care about disadvantageous
and advantageous inequity. That is, concerns exist regarding distributive fairness in the
channel. Still, since α > β, the estimation does confirm that players are more dissatisfied
with experiencing disadvantageous than advantageous inequity.
Finally, note that both players are boundedly rational. In particular, the QRE pa-
rameter for the retailer in the full model is given by λR = .08, while the QRE parameter
for the manufacturer is λM = .02. Since a lower QRE parameter implies a higher rate
of mistakes, the estimated results indicate that the manufacturer is more prone to mis-
takes when choosing prices than the retailer. Intuitively, the difference in the QRE
parameters can be attributed to the manufacturer’s more complicated decisions. This
is consistent with the experimental setup in which the manufacturer had to anticipate
the retailer’s boundedly rational responses when deciding on the wholesale price, while
the retailer simply set a retail price p after observing the wholesale price w.
Learning model In addition to the base model, I estimated a model in which subjects
were allowed to learn over time (Camerer and Ho 1999; Camerer, Ho, and Chong 2002,
2003; Chen, et al. 2012). To represent learning, I let the QRE parameter change over
time according to the following:
λi(t) = λi + (θi − λi)e−δ(t−1) (2.10)
where i indicates whether the subject is a retailer or a manufacturer and the bounded
rationality parameter λ(t) decays exponentially over time.
Note that λi(1) = θi and λi(∞) = λi. Therefore, θi can be interpreted as the
initial rationality parameter, λi as the eventual rationality parameter, and δ captures
the rate of learning. Given that the manufacturer and the retailer face different decision
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situations, I assume the initial and the final rationality parameters will be different for
different types of players, and I assume that all players are learning at the same rate.
As for the base model, I run a series of models that allow me to compare the standard
model without fairness to the models that incorporate different fairness ideals. Once
again, models allowing for fairness dominate the standard model and the fairness ideal
that best represents data is the sequence-aligned ideal (see Table 2.7).
Table 2.7: Estimation Results Of The Model With Learning
α = β = 0 Sequence- Strict Liberal Strictly
Aligned Egalitarian Egalitarian Libertarian
θR .06 .05 .05 .05 .06
(.02)*** (.01)*** (.01)*** (.01)*** (.02)***
λR .16 .27 .19 .16 .16
(.05)*** (.71) (.17) (.08)** (.06)***
θM .01 .02 .02 .02 .02
(.01)*** (.00)*** (.01)*** (.01)*** (.01)***
λM .03 .05 .04 .03 .03
(.01)*** (.10) (.02) (.01)*** (.01)***
δ .18 .04 .10 .15 .18
(.19) (.16) (.18) (.18) (.19)
α - .42 .15 .07 .01
(.10)*** (.04)*** (.03)** (.01)
β - .00 .00 .00 .00
(.17) (.17) (.15) (.14)
Observations 4404 4404 4404 4404 4404
LL -3124.99 -3109.48 -3110.28 -3121.69 -3124.34
vs. α=β=0 - 31.02*** 29.42*** 6.6** 1.3
AIC 6259.98 6232.96 6234.56 6257.38 6262.68
BIC 6291.93 6277.69 6279.29 6302.11 6307.41
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
In the interest of space, I limit my discussion to the best fitting model, the newly-
proposed sequence-aligned model. Once again, I find that the parameter for disadvan-
tageous inequity is significant; the retailer experiences disutility when its profit is less
than half of the manufacturer’s profit. Additionally, the initial rationality parameter
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indicates that subjects are boundedly rational. The learning parameter is not signifi-
cant, suggesting that there is no significant learning over time. This inability to learn
might be due to the experimental protocol, which randomly matched subjects at each
round-this makes the game a one-shot opportunity with no ability to display learning
(regardless of whether it might have taken place).
In general, the results of the model that considers learning are comparable those of
the base model. Comparing across models, the fairness parameters are similar, with both
disadvantageous inequity parameters significant and not significantly different and both
advantageous inequity parameters not significantly different from zero. The bounded
rationality parameters are also consistent, suggesting that subjects are boundedly ra-
tional and retailers tend to make fewer mistakes than manufacturers. As for the base
model, I speculate that the difference between the rationality parameters in the learning
model is due to the higher complexity of the choice faced by the manufacturer as the
first-move player.
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, I experimentally investigate the theoretical predictions on prices in a
dyadic channel, where the manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg leader in setting prices,
and the retailer acts as a follower. A behavioral model that incorporates both retailers’
concerns for fairness and bounded rationality by both firms is proposed to explain the
discrepancy between theoretical predictions and empirical regularities. Through this
enriched model, I investigate how equitable payoffs are determined in the fair channel
and propose a new principle of fairness, the sequence-aligned fairness ideal. This work
makes several contributions to the literature.
First, to the best of my knowledge, this research is the first to empirically study
fairness ideals in distribution channel. I provide an estimation of fairness parameters
in a channel context, and the results suggest that there are significant fairness concerns
in dyadic channels. In particular, I find that players are adverse to both advantageous
and disadvantageous inequities, and they display a greater aversion for disadvantageous
inequity than for advantageous inequity. This research finding provides evidence that
fairness can significantly affect firms’ decisions in channel and offers support to the
64
notion that fairness can modify channel relations.
Second, this research contributes to the understanding of the determinants of equi-
table payoffs between fair-minded agents in business relations. I compare three com-
monly proposed fairness principles (Cappelen et al. 2007)-strict egalitarian, liberal
egalitarian, and strict libertarian-with a newly proposed principle of fairness. The new
sequence-aligned ideal reflects the power structure of the channel. Comparing and
modeling the four principles suggests that the sequence-aligned ideal significantly out-
performs other ideals in describing subjects’ behaviors in our experiments. The newly
established ideal is particularly interesting and important because it reflects the concept
that the equitable payoff for the retailer is consonant with the ratio of players’ profits
in the standard Stackelberg game and suggests that power structure affects what is
perceived as “fair”. This finding indicates that it is fair for the more powerful firm (in
our model, the manufacturer as a Stackelberg leader in our model) to obtain a higher
payoff. This finding contributes to the literature on distribution channels by showing
how power influences channel members’ notions of deserved profits and how such beliefs
affect decisions and eventually guide the realization of profits for all the members in a
channel.
Last, but not least, this study includes both inclinations for social preferences and
bounded rationality. I differentiate and quantify both effects through incentive-aligned
experimental studies. On one hand, I find that both manufacturers and retailers make
errors in their decisions, although to different extents. Since the manufacturer is the first
mover in a Stackelberg game, setting its wholesale price before the retailer decides on
the retail price, the manufacturer faces a more complex task. This is confirmed by my
estimation: the QRE parameter for the manufacturer is significantly smaller than that
for the retailer and the manufacturer is less rational than the retailer. Moreover, when
subjects interact repeatedly, they learn more than when they interact with different
opponents. On the other hand, I find that even after accounting for bounded rationality,
fairness concerns still significantly affect firms’ decisions. This implies that deviations
in players’ pricing decisions from predictions of the standard economic model are not
entirely due to errors in decision making-emotion, in the form of concern for fairness,
clearly influences the interactions between firms in dyadic distribution channels.
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Appendix A
Sample
Kindle Experiment. The sample collected was fairly heterogeneous and a relatively
good representation of the US market. Of the 47 subjects that participated in my
experiment, 55.3% were female. Respondents varied in age between 18 and 65, with
the average respondent being 39.6 years old. The majority of the subjects had a high
school (46.8%) or a college degree (38.3%), with the rest having a master’s (8.5%) or
a graduate degree (6.4%). Even in terms of household income, the sample was fairly
heterogeneous, with the majority of the subjects (36.2%) declaring a household income
between $25,000 and $49,999, 23.4% declaring an income below $25,000, 17.0% declaring
an income between $50,000 and $74,999 and the remaining 23.4% declaring a household
income above $75,000.
Yoplait Experiment 1. The sample collected was fairly heterogeneous and a rela-
tively good representation of the US market. Of the 51 subjects that participated in
my experiment, 39.2% were female. Respondents varied in age between 18 and 65, with
the average respondent being 39.8 years old. The majority of the subjects had a college
degree (51.0%), another 37.4% of the subjects had a high school diploma, while the rest
had a master’s (5.9%) or a graduate degree (5.9%). Even in terms of household income,
the sample was fairly heterogeneous, with the majority of the subjects (43.1%) declar-
ing a household income between $25,000 and $49,999, 37.3% declaring an income below
$25,000, 17.7% declaring an income between $50,000 and $74,999 and the remaining
17.7% declaring a household income above $75,000.
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Yoplait Experiment 2. The sample consisted of full time students (undergraduate
and graduate) at a large public university. Of the 61 subjects that participated in my
experiment, 39.2% were female. Respondents ranged in age between 19 and 60, with
75% of subjects being 24 or younger), and the average respondent being 24.4 years old.
The majority of the subjects reported to have a high school diploma (37.7%), another
31.2% of the subjects had a college degree, while the rest had a master’s (13.1%) or
a graduate degree (18%). The majority of the subjects (54.1%) reported a household
income below $25,000, 11.5% declared an income between $25,000 snd $49,999, 16.4%
declaring an income between $50,000 and $74,999 and the remaining 18% declared a
household income above $75,000.
Appendix B
Model Analysis
Proof of Lemma 1.1. First, compute q by finding the location of the marginal
consumer who is indifferent between buying for Firm 1 or Firm 2. For such consumers
U1 = U2.
Solving for x when U1 = U2 yields:
q1 = 1− q2 =
β
(√
d1 −
√
d2
)− p1 + p2 − α(d1 − κp1)+ + α(d2 − κp2)+ + t
2t
(B1)
Hence the duopolist problem is given by:
max
pi,di
(pi − di)qi (B2)
And plugging B1 into B2, the profit function for firm i is given by:
pii = (pi − di)
β
(√
di −
√
dj
)− pi + pj − α(di − κpi)+ + α(dj − κpj)+ + t
2t
(B3)
Firms decide first whether to offer donation embedded products, then they decide on
an optimal level of donation and prices. Hence, to solve for the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium I first maximize profits with respect to prices and then maximize donations
given the decision to (not) offer donation embedded products for each firm. Finally I
compare the profits for the 4 possible scenarios: 1) both firms offer donation embedded
products; 2) no firm offers donation embedded products; 3) Firm 1 offers donation
embedded products and Firm 2 does not; and 4) Firm 2 offers donation embedded
products and Firm 1 does not.
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The maximization process withing the subgames is as follows. Given any level of
donation di the firm can choose 2 levels of prices: 1) κp ≤ d; and 2)κp > d. Within
each condition, I maximized profits first by profits and then by donations. Finally,
I compared profits across cases and picked the strategy that maximized profits while
satisfying all conditions. I report only the results of the subgames in the interest of
space.
If both firms decide not to offer donation embedded products, then the optimal
prices, quantities and profits are given by:
d1 = d2 = 0; p1 = p2 = t; q1 = q2 =
1
2
; pi1 = pi2 =
t
2
(B4)
If both firms decide to offer donation embedded products, then the optimal donation,
prices, quantities and profits are given by:
For β2 > 12κ(1+α−ακ)
2t
(1−ακ)(1−κ)
d1 = d2 =
β2
4(α+ 1− ακ)2 ; p1 = p2 =
β2
4(1 + α− ακ)2 +
t
1− ακ ; (B5)
q1 = q2 =
1
2
; pi1 = pi2 =
t
2(1− ακ)
For 4κ(1−κ) t ≤ β2 ≤ 12κ(1+α−ακ)
2t
(1−ακ)(1−κ)
d1 = d2 =
κt
1− κ ; p1 = p2 =
t
1− κ ; q1 = q2 =
1
2
; pi1 = pi2 =
t
2
(B6)
For 0 < β2 < 4κ(1−κ) t
d1 = d2 =
β2
4
; p1 = p2 =
β2
4
+ t; q1 = q2 =
1
2
; pi1 = pi2 =
t
2
(B7)
If Firm 1 decides to offer donation embedded products and Firm 2 decides not to
offer donation embedded products, the optimal donation, prices, quantities and profits
are given by:
For β2 > 12κ(1+α−ακ)
2t
[3−4κ(1+α−ακ)] and β
2 < 12(1 + α− ακ)t
d1 =
β2
4(α+ 1− ακ)2 ; d2 = 0 (B8)
p1 =
t
1− ακ +
(4 + α− 4ακ)β2
12(1 + α− ακ)(1− ακ) ; p2 = t−
β2
12(1 + α− ακ)
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q1 =
(12(1 + α− ακ)t+ β2)
24(1 + α− ακ)t ; q2 =
(12(1 + α− ακ)t− β2)
24(1 + α− ακ)t
pi1 =
(12(1 + α− ακ)t+ β2)2
288(1 + α− ακ)2(1− ακ)t ; pi2 =
(12(1 + α− ακ)t− β2)2
288(1 + α− ακ)2t
For β2 > 12κ(1+α−ακ)
2t
[3−4κ(1+α−ακ)] and β
2 > 12(1 + α− ακ)t
d1 =
β2
4(α+ 1− ακ)2 ; d2 = 0 (B9)
p1 =
t
1− ακ +
(4 + α− 4ακ)β2
12(1 + α− ακ)(1− ακ) ; p2 = 0
q1 = 1; q2 = 0
pi1 =
(12(1 + α− ακ)t+ β2)
12(1 + α− ακ)(1− ακ)t ; pi2 = 0
For 6κ(3−2κ) t ≤ β2 ≤ 12κ(1+α−ακ)
2t
[3−4κ(1+α−ακ)] and β
2 > (1−κ)
2
2κ(1+κ) t
d1 =
β2 + 2t− β
√
β2 + 4t
2κ2
; d2 = 0 (B10)
p1 =
β2 + 2t− β
√
β2 + 4t
2κ
; p2 = 0
q1 =
−β2 + 2(−1 + κ)t+ β
(√
β2 + 4t+
√
2κ
√
β2 + 2t− b
√
β2 + 4t
)
4κt
;
q2 =
β2 + 2(1 + κ)t− β
(√
β2 + 4t+
√
2κ
√
β2 + 2t− β
√
β2 + 4t
)
4κt
pi1 = (1− κ)
(
β2 + 2t− β
√
β2 + 4t
)
(
−β2 + 2(−1 + κ)t+ β
(√
β2 + 4t+
√
2κ
√
β2 + 2t− β
√
β2 + 4t
))
8κ2t
; pi2 = 0
For 6κ(3−2κ) t ≤ β2 ≤ 12κ(1+α−ακ)
2t
[3−4κ(1+α−ακ)] and β
2 ≤ (1−κ)22κ(1+κ) t
d1 =
β2 + 2t− β
√
β2 + 4t
2κ2
; d2 = 0 (B11)
p1 =
β2 + 2t− β
√
β2 + 4t
2κ
; p2 = 0
q1 = 0; q2 = 1
pi1 = 0; pi2 = 0
80
For 0 < β2 < 6κ(3−2κ) t
d1 =
β2
4
; d2 = 0 (B12)
p1 = t+
β2
6
; p2 = t− β
2
12
q1 =
(12t+ β2)
24t
; q2 =
(12t− β2)
24t
pi1 =
(12t+ β2)2
288t
; pi2 =
(12t− β2)2
288t
The subgame in which Firm 2 offers donation embedded products and Firm 1 does
not offer donation embedded products is symmetric and won’t be discussed in the in-
terest of space.
Comparing the subgames, I find that both firms offer donation embedded products
if β2 > 4κ(1+α−ακ)
2t
(1−κ)(1−ακ) or if 0 < β
2 < 4κ(1−κ) t and β
2 < 4κ(1+α−ακ)
2t
(1−κ)(1−ακ) . For the remaining
region, I have multiple equilibria with either both firms offering donation embedded
products, or no firms offering donation embedded products.
For β2 > 4κ(1+α−ακ)
2t
(1−κ)(1−ακ) both firms offer donation embedded products, and donations,
prices, quantities and profits are given by:
d1 = d2 =
β2
4(α+ 1− ακ)2 ; p1 = p2 =
β2
4(1 + α− ακ)2 +
t
1− ακ (B13)
q1 = q2 =
1
2
; pi1 = pi2 =
t
2(1− ακ)
For 4κ(1−κ) t ≤ β2 ≤ 4κ(1+α−ακ)
2t
(1−κ)(1−ακ) two equilibria exist:
d1 = d2 =
κt
1− κ ; p1 = p2 =
t
1− κ ; q1 = q2 =
1
2
; pi1 = pi2 =
t
2
(B14)
or
d1 = d2 = 0; p1 = p2 = t; q1 = q2 =
1
2
; pi1 = pi2 =
t
2
(B15)
Finally, for 0 < β2 < 4κ(1−κ) t and β
2 < 4κ(1+α−ακ)
2t
(1−κ)(1−ακ) both firms offer donation em-
bedded products, and donations, prices, quantities and profits are given by:
d1 = d2 =
β2
4
; p1 = p2 =
β2
4
+ t; q1 = q2 =
1
2
; pi1 = pi2 =
t
2
(B16)
Q.E.D.
Appendix C
Model Analysis
Solving Optimal Prices and Investment of the Standard Economic Model.
Assume base line demand, BD, is given by BD = a + IM · RM + IR · RR, and market
demand, D(p) is given by D (p) = BD − b · p with b > 0. Further assume that manu-
facturer’s and retailer’s profits are given by the sum of the residual endowment and the
profit from product sale so that ΠM = E−IM+w·D(p) and ΠR = E−IR+(p−w)·D(p).
First the retailer maximizes its profit with respect to p, maxp ΠR = E − IR + (p −
w) ·D(p). From first order condition we get p∗(w, IM , IR) = a+IM ·RM+IR·RR+w2b . Given
p∗, The manufacturer maximizes its profits with respect to w, maxw ΠM = E − IM +
w ·D(p∗). From first order condition, we then have w∗(IM , IR) = a+IM ·RM+IR·RR2b and
p∗(IM , IR) =
3(a+IM ·RM+IR·RR)
4b .
Substituting optimal prices into profits, the manufacturers’ total profit is given by
ΠM (IM , IR) = E − IM + (a+IM ·RM+IR·RR)
2
8b and the retailers’ total profit is given by
ΠR(IM , IR) = E − IR + (a+IM ·RM+IR·RR)
2
16b .
Because the profit function is convex in investments,
D2
(
ΠM (IM , IR)
ΠR(IM , IR)
)
=
[
R2M RM ·RR
RM ·RR R2R
]
is positive semidefinite, we will al-
ways have corner solutions to the maximization problem. Hence for i = M,R, either
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Ii = 0 or Ii = E so that
(I∗M , I
∗
R) =

(0, 0) if 0 < RM < RM1 and 0 < RR < RR1
(0, E) if 0 < RM < RM2 and RR ≥ RR1
(E, 0) if RM ≥ RM1 and 0 < RR < RR2
(E,E) if RM ≥ RM3 and RR ≥ RR3
.
We can compute the threshold values by comparing profits for different investment
strategies. In order for (0, 0) to be an equilibrium, we must have ΠM (0, 0) > ΠM (E, 0)
and ΠR(0, 0) > ΠR(0, E). This leads to
a2
8b +E >
(a+E·RM )2
8b and
a2
16b +E >
(a+E·RR)2
16b .
Defining RM1 =
1
E (
√
a2 + 8bE − a) and RR1 = 1E (
√
a2 + 16bE − a), it is easy to show
that the conditions are equivalent to 0 < RM < RM1 and 0 < RR < RR1.
Similarly, for (E,E) to be an equilibrium, we have ΠM (E,E) ≥ ΠM (0, E) and
ΠR(E,E) ≥ ΠR(E, 0), which leads to
(a+ E ·RM + E ·RR)2
8b
≥ (a+ E ·RR)
2
8b
+ E (C1)
and
(a+ E ·RM + E ·RR)2
16b
≥ (a+ E ·RM )
2
16b
− E (C2)
Denote RM by x and RR by y, so equation A1 becomes ΦM (x, y) = Ex
2 + 2x(a +
Ey)− 8b ≥ 0 and equation A2 becomes ΦR(x, y) = Ey2 + 2y(a+ Ex)− 16b ≥ 0.
For (0, E) to be an equilibrium, the conditions are ΠM (0, E) > ΠM (E,E) and
ΠR(0, E) ≥ ΠR(0, 0), which implies that ΦM < 0 and RR ≥ RR1. Similarly, the
conditions for (E, 0) to be an equilibrium are given by ΦR < 0 and RM ≥ RM1.
Hence, to solve forRM2, RR2, RM3, andRR3, it is sufficient to solve ΦM (RM2, RR) =0
for RM2, ΦR(RM , RR2) =0 for RR2, and to simultaneously solve ΦM (RM3, RR3) =0 and
ΦR(RM3, RR3) =0 for RM3 and RR3.
Solving Optimal Prices of the Behavioral Model. Given the baseline demand
BD = a+IMRM+IRRR, the manufacturer’s profit is given by piM = w(BD−bp) and the
retailers’ utility is given by UR = piR−α ·max{ τ1−τ piM−piR, 0}−β ·max{piR− τ1−τ piM , 0}.
Because the utility function is not continuously differentiable, we need to distinguish
between the cases in which the retailer experiences disadvantageous and advantageous
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inequity. The retailer experiences disadvantageous inequity when piR − τ1−τ piM ≤ 0
or equivalently p ≤ (1 + τ1−τ )w. Hence, the retailer faces the following maximization
problem
max
p
(p− w)(BD − bp)− α [ τ
1− τ w − (p− w)](BD − bp)
s.t. p ≤ (1 + τ
1− τ )w.
Similarly, the retailer experiences advantageous inequity when piR − τ1−τ piM ≥ 0 or
equivalently p ≥ (1 + τ1−τ )w. Hence, the retailer faces the following maximization
problem
max
p
(p− w)(BD − bp)− β
[
(p− w)− τ
1− τ w
]
(BD − bp)
s.t. p ≤ (1 + τ
1− τ )w.
Following Cui, Raju and Zhang (2007), the optimal retail prices are given by
p∗(w, IM , IR) =

BD+w
2b −
βw τ
1−τ
2(1−β) if w ≤ w2
w + τ1−τw if w2 < w ≤ w1
BD+w
2b −
αw τ
1−τ
2(1+α) if w > w1
where w1 =
a(1−α)
1+α+(2+α) τ
1−τ
and w2 =
a(1−β)
1−β−(2+β) τ
1−τ
.
If the manufacturer chooses a price in the range w ≤ w2, then the manufacturer’s
maximization problem is given by max
w
w(BD−bp), s.t. p = BD+w2 −
βw τ
1−τ
2(1−β) and w ≤ w2.
If the manufacturer chooses a price from the range w2 < w ≤ w1, then the manufac-
turer’s maximization problem is given by max
w
w(BD − bp), s.t. p = w + γ ·w, w > w2,
and w ≤ w1.
If the manufacturer chooses a price in the range w > w1, then the manufacturer’s
maximization problem is given by max
w
w(BD−bp), s.t. p = BD+w2b − αγ·w2(1+α) and w > w1.
The optimal wholesale prices can be solved accordingly and are given by
w∗(IM , IR) =

wI if 0 < β ≤ 1− 3τ and α ≥ β
wIII if 1− 3τ < β ≤ 1− τ and β ≤ α < α
w2 if 1− 3τ < β ≤ 1− τ and α ≥ max {α, β}
wIII if β = 1− τ and β ≤ α < 2τ − 1
w2 if β = 1− τ and α ≥ max{2τ − 1, β}
wIII if 1− τ < β < 1 and β ≤ α < 2τ − 1
wII if 1− τ < β < 1 and α ≥ max{2τ − 1, β}
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where wI =
BD(1−β)
2b(1−β−β τ
1−τ )
, wII =
BD
2b(1+ τ
1−τ )
, wIII =
BD(1+α)
2b(1+α+αγ) , and α =
(1−β−3τ)2−8βτ2
8τ2−(1−β−3τ)2 .
Appendix D
Instructions
You are about to participate in a decision-making experiment. By following these
instructions you can earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in
cash before you leave today. Your earnings depend on your decisions as well as on the
decisions of other participants. It is important that you do not look at the decisions
of others, and that you do not talk, laugh, or make noises during the experiment. You
will be warned if you violate this rule the first time. If you violate this rule twice, you
will be asked to leave the room immediately and your cash earnings will be $0. The
experiment is designed in a way that the anonymity of all the participants is protected.
In this experiment, there will be a total of 20 decision rounds. In each round, you
will earn point earnings measured in pesos. The more pesos points you earn, the more
cash earnings you make. The decision steps and how you earn pesos points in every
round are described as follows:
In each round, you will be randomly matched with another person in the room. You
will be acting as either a retailer or a manufacturer. The other person who is matched
with you will be acting as a manufacturer if you are acting as a retailer, or will be acting
as a retailer if you are acting as a manufacturer. You will act as a manufacturer in 10
out of the 20 rounds and will act as a retailer in the other 10 rounds. In each round,
both you and the person you are matched with will make decisions in two phases – an
investment phase and a pricing phase. In the investment phase, both the manufacturer
and the retailer will each be assigned with 10 pesos and they decide how much to
invest to increase the base demand of the product that the retailer is buying from the
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manufacturer and selling to consumers. In the pricing phase, the manufacturer will
decide on the wholesale price and the retailer will decide on the retail price of the
product. Consumer demands, the manufacturer’s profit, and the retailer’s profit will be
determined as described below. A manufacturer will not meet with the same retailer
for more than once, and a retailer will not meet with the same manufacturer for more
than once.
Experimental Procedure The following procedural steps will be repeated in each
of the 20 decision rounds:
Step 1: Determining your role
Your computer screen will show whether you are a manufacturer or a retailer in each
round. Every subject will be a retailer for 10 rounds and a manufacturer for the other
10 rounds.
Step 2: Determining each member’s investment amount
At the beginning of each round both the manufacturer and the retailer will each
start with 10 pesos. You will decide how much of the 10 pesos to invest. You can
choose to invest 0 pesos, 5 pesos or 10 pesos. After both the manufacturer and retailer
decide on their investments, their investment amounts will be shown to each other. Each
investment is going to affect the total demand for the product in the way below.
Step 3: Determination of total demand
After both the manufacturer and retailer make investments (denoted as IM for man-
ufacturer and IR for retailer in pesos), the total demand D in unit is determined as
follows.
D = 1 + 0.2 ∗ IM + 0.2 ∗ IR− P
That is, whenever you make an investment, the investment is going to increase the
base demand of the product by 0.2 times of your investments if you are acting as the
manufacturer or by 0.2 times of your investments if you are acting as the retailer. Here
P refers to the retail price that will be chosen by the retailer later.
Step 4: Manufacturer decides on wholesale price W
After investment amounts IM and IR are chosen, the manufacturer decides on whole-
sale price W at which the manufacturer sells the product to the retailer.
Step 5: Retailer decides on retail price P
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After the wholesale price W is set by the manufacturer, the retailer decides on retail
price P .
Step 6: Profits to the manufacturer and retailer
After the manufacturer chooses wholesale price W and the retailer decides on the
retail price P , the manufacturer’s total profit PiM is given by:
PiM = 10− IM +W ∗D
The retailer’s total profit PiR is given by:
PiR = 10− IR+ (P −W ) ∗D
Here D is the demand, 10 is the amount of pesos you start with, and IM or IR is
the investment amount you made before.
You will play a test game of 2 rounds before the formal game starts.
Example
Suppose the manufacturer invests 5 pesos and the retailer invests 5 pesos. The
manufacturer charges a wholesale price of 1.5 pesos and the retailer charges a retail
price of 2.25 pesos. Then total demand D is going to be given by
D = 1 + 0.2 ∗ 5 + 0.2 ∗ 5− 2.25 = 0.75
PiM = 10− IM +W ∗D = 10− 5 + 1.5 ∗ 0.75 = 6.125
PiR = 10− IR+ (P −W ) ∗D = 10− 5 + (2.25− 1.5) ∗ 0.75 = 5.5625
Your Payoffs
Your dollar earnings for the experiment are determined as follows. First, we will
sum up your pesos earnings for each of the 20 rounds in which you participated. The
profit is going to be converted at a fix rate of dollars per pesos. On top of these earnings
you will get a $5 participation fee. We will pay you this amount when you leave the
experiment. Note the more pesos you earn, the more money you will receive.
